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INVESTIGATIONS FOLLOWING THE AMENDMENT OF
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 408
Mikah K. Story Thompson*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 1, 2006, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
surprised many scholars when it amended Federal Rule of Evidence 408,
which concerns the admissibility of offers of compromise.1 Prior to its
amendment, Rule 408 generally prohibited the admissibility of
statements made during settlement talks when offered to prove or
disprove liability.2 While the newly amended Rule 408 maintains this
general exclusion as to statements made to private litigants during
settlement talks, it creates an exception for statements made to
government officials.3 Under the new Rule 408, any statement made to
a government official during settlement talks, which typically occurs
when the official is acting in a civil capacity, is admissible in a later
criminal trial.4
A hypothetical fact pattern can demonstrate the difference between
the two rules. Assume the government has charged three defendants
with mail and wire fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion.5 The
three defendants were formerly President and Executive Vice Presidents
in an investment company, LOF.6 Prior to the indictment, counsel for
LOF filed a civil lawsuit against the three officers and hired a private
investigation firm to look into allegations that the three officers had

∗ Associate Professor of Law, the University of Missouri-Kansas City. I am deeply grateful to
the entire faculty at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, with special thanks to Dean
Ellen Suni, Barbara Glesner-Fines, David Achtenberg, Jasmine Abdel-khalik, and Lawrence
MacLachlan. I would also like to thank Debra Banister and LaDonna McCullough for their exceptional
assistance and Brandon P. Thompson for his constant moral support.
1. See infra Part II.B.
2. See FED. R. EVID. 408, 28 U.S.C. app. § 870 (2000) (amended 2006). See infra text
accompanying note 34.
3. See FED. R. EVID. 408. See infra text accompanying note 80.
4. See id.
5. These are the facts of United States v. Skeddle, 176 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
6. See id. at 255.
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stolen money from LOF.7 The private investigation firm interviewed
each of the three officers, and during those interviews, the three officers
made incriminating statements.8 The investigation firm drafted written
summaries of the interviews.9 Counsel for LOF and the three officers
agree that the interviews were the first step toward negotiating a
settlement between LOF and the three officers.10 LOF eventually turned
over the interview summaries to the government, and the officers were
indicted.11 At trial, both the old Rule 408 and the new Rule 408 would
prevent the government from introducing evidence of the defendants’
incriminating statements to prove criminal liability. However, a small
change in the fact pattern would affect the outcome of the hypothetical.
Rather than a private investigation firm, assume that a government
agency, acting in its civil capacity, investigated the three officers and
drafted written summaries of interviews between the officers and the
government agency. Under the old Rule 408, the presence of the
government agency would not affect the admissibility of the evidence.
However, under the new 408, the statements made to the government
agency would be admissible in a later criminal trial involving these three
defendants, even though all parties agree that the statements were a first
step toward settlement between the government agency and the officers.
For reasons discussed later in this Article, the drafters of the new Rule
408 believe that statements made to private litigants during settlement
talks deserve greater protection than statements made to government
officials in the same context. More importantly, this new amendment
creates an inconspicuous trap awaiting any person who is the subject of
a civil investigation by a governmental body. Even where a defendant
successfully settles a civil dispute with the government, he must now
recognize that any admissions of fault made during those settlement
talks can become the basis for a later criminal proceeding.
This Article demonstrates that the drafters erred when they decided to
hinge the admissibility of evidence upon the presence or non-presence of
the government. Part II discusses the history of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and Rule 408 specifically, as well as the circuit split that
precipitated amendment of the rule. Part III addresses the many
situations in which the government may act in both a criminal and civil
capacity. Part IV discusses the safeguards, if any, that protect an
individual or corporation facing both criminal and civil liability at the
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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hands of the government. Part V addresses whether a settlement
communications privilege might provide adequate protection to
defendants facing simultaneous civil and criminal liability. Part V also
proposes a solution that protects the rights of individuals who seek to
cooperate with civil governmental investigations while allowing for the
admissibility of relevant evidence. Part VI provides a conclusion.
II. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975.12 Forty-two
states have adopted codes based on the Federal Rules of Evidence.13
The rules concern the admissibility of evidence at trial. Professors
Mueller and Kirkpatrick state several reasons for the existence of the
rules, including a basic mistrust of juries, a guarantee of accurate factfinding, and an effort to control the scope and duration of trials.14 The
authors write that the Federal Rules of Evidence exclude certain types of
evidence because jurors may be unable to make a proper evaluation of
them.15 Professor Fisher calls the rules a type of “quality control at the
front end.”16 While the trial judge may be unable to control what jury
does with the evidence it receives,17 the trial judge can ensure that
certain types of evidence never reach the jury.18 Another reason for the
rules, according to Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick, involves a quest
for accurate fact-finding. Several rules of evidence exist to ensure that
the jury reviews only relevant and reliable evidence.19 Finally, the rules
of evidence exist to control the scope and duration of trials. The federal
rules allow a trial judge to “control the sequence of proof and manner of
examining witnesses”20 and “exclude evidence because it would take
more time than it is worth and might confuse the jury.”21
The rules are divided into several articles, which group rules by their
subject matter. The next subpart addresses Article IV, “Relevancy and
12. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
13. See 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5009 (2d ed. 2005) (noting that the only states which have not adopted some form of the
Rules are California, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, and Virginia).
14. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 2 (3d ed. 2003).
15. Id.
16. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 16 (2002).
17. See United States v. Tanner, 483 U.S. 107, 116–27 (1987) (finding that Rule 606(b)
generally prevents the court from delving into the goings-on in the jury deliberation room).
18. See FISHER, supra note 16.
19. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 14, at 2.
20. Id. (citing Rule 611, which empowers the trial judge to control the courtroom).
21. Id. (citing Rule 403, which excludes evidence that may confuse the jury or waste the court’s
time).
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Its Limits”.
A.

Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence

Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence concerns the admissibility
of relevant evidence. Rule 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence,”22 while Rule 402 states
that relevant evidence is generally admissible while irrelevant evidence
is not admissible.23 These two rules allow for the admissibility of all
evidence that is relevant, unless the evidence is excluded by the U.S.
Constitution, an Act of Congress, other Federal Rules of Evidence, or
other rules created by the U.S. Supreme Court.24
Rule 403 provides for the first exclusion of relevant evidence. The
text of Rule 403 is as follows: “Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.”25 Rule 403 authorizes judges to balance the
probative value26 of a piece of evidence against the likelihood that the
evidence will unfairly harm a party, confuse the jury or waste the court’s
time. Rule 403 balancing most often involves assessing the probative
value of a piece of evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice to a
party. The Advisory Committee Notes following Rule 403 define unfair
prejudice as “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”27
According to the Advisory Committee Notes following Rule 403, the
remaining rules in Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence are
concrete applications of Rule 403. Each of the remaining rules concerns
a situation where the unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
redundancy resulting from a piece of evidence substantially outweighs
22. FED. R. EVID. 401.
23. FED. R. EVID. 402.
24. Id.
25. FED. R. EVID. 403.
26. The Advisory Committee defines “probative value” in the following manner: “The standard
of probability under the rule is ‘more . . . probable than it would be without the evidence.’” FED. R.
EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note.
27. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note. See also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S.
172, 180 (1997) (“The term ‘unfair prejudice,’ as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some
concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof
specific to the offense charged.”).
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any probative value associated with the evidence.28 For example, Rule
404, which concerns character evidence, creates a general exclusion of
character evidence when offered to show that a person has a propensity
to act in a certain manner.29 Thus, Rule 404 would exclude evidence
that a criminal defendant, charged with murder, has a character for
violence, when such evidence is offered to show that the defendant acted
in conformity with that character trait on the occasion in question.30 In
drafting Rule 404, Congress pre-determined that any evidence of this
nature would unfairly prejudice the defendant such that the evidence
should be excluded despite its relevance, thereby satisfying Rule 403’s
balancing test regardless of the facts of each case.31
The remaining rules in Article IV cover a variety of situations where
the unfair prejudice of type of evidence outweighs its probative value.32
The next subpart of this Article addresses Rule 408, which concerns
settlement offers and agreements.
B.

Rule 408

Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, entitled “Compromise and
Offers to Compromise,” addresses the admissibility of offers to settle
claims and conduct or statements made during compromise
negotiations.33 The rule was amended on December 1, 2006. The old
Rule 408, enacted in 1974, provided:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2)
accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in
compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed
28. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note.
29. FED. R. EVID. 404 (“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible
for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion . . . .”).
30. See 40A AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 291 (2007). As the Supreme Court has stated:
The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to
weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad
general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. The
overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the
practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair
surprise and undue prejudice.
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (footnote omitted).
31. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note.
32. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID 407 (excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures); FED. R.
EVID. 409 (excluding evidence of offers to pay medical expenses); FED. R. EVID. 410 (excluding
withdrawn pleas of guilty); FED. R. EVID. 411 (excluding evidence of the existence or non-existence of
liability insurance); FED. R. EVID. 412 (excluding evidence of an alleged victim’s past sexual behavior
or sexual predisposition).
33. FED. R. EVID. 408.
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as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or
invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements
made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule
does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable
merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations.
This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for
another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness,
negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a
criminal investigation or prosecution.34

The old Rule 408 had some preliminary requirements before its
exclusion would apply to a piece of evidence, and these requirements
remain in the new rule. First, the Rule only applies to claims that are
disputed as to validity or amount.35 Thus, where no lawsuit has been
filed and no dispute exists as to the validity or amount of a claim, Rule
408 does not apply.36 However, where parties enter into settlement
negotiations in hopes of avoiding the filing of a lawsuit, Rule 408 would
protect statements made during those negotiations.37 Additionally, the
rule only applies where the purpose of the evidence is to establish one
party’s culpability.38 If the purpose of the evidence is to establish
anything other than one party’s culpability, Rule 408 will not bar the
evidence. Some of the permissible purposes for evidence of settlement
negotiations are (1) proving bias or prejudice of a witness, (2) negating a
claim of undue delay, or (3) proving that a party has tried to obstruct a
criminal investigation or prosecution.39 In a sense, Rule 408 functions
as a rule of inclusion. It states that, as a general matter, evidence of
offers to compromise is admissible unless the purpose of the evidence is
to establish a party’s culpability.
Under the old Rule 408, offers to settle claims and statements or
conduct made during compromise negotiations were not admissible to
prove or disprove liability.40 For example, assume that plaintiff has sued
defendant for personal injuries suffered as a result of an automobile
accident. Further assume that plaintiff and defendant and their
34. FED. R. EVID. 408, 28 U.S.C. app. § 870 (2000) (amended 2006).
35. Id.
36. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 408.06
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2007).
37. Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning Servs., Inc. v. Total Waste Mgmt. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 225,
228–29 (D.N.H. 1993) (“The language of Rule 408 contains no ‘bright-line’ rule requiring that a
complaint be filed, and the court believes such a ‘bright-line’ rule would undermine the purpose of Rule
408.”).
38. FED. R. EVID. 408, 28 U.S.C. app. § 870 (2000) (amended 2006) (“This rule . . . does not
require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose . . . .”).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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respective attorneys have decided to meet to discuss settlement of the
matter. If, during the settlement negotiations, defendant admits he was
intoxicated on the day in question, Rule 408 would prohibit the plaintiff
from offering defendant’s admission into evidence to prove defendant’s
fault.
The U.S. Supreme Court, drafters of the old Rule 408, based the
rule’s evidentiary exclusions on two grounds. First, the drafters thought
that evidence of an offer to settle is irrelevant.41 In essence, the drafters
opined that an offer to settle has no tendency to make defendant’s
liability more or less probable, because the offer could be “motivated by
a desire for peace rather than from any concession of weakness of
position.”42 Like several of the other rules found in Article IV, Rule 408
demonstrates concrete application of Rule 403’s balancing test.
Evidence of an offer to settle lacks probative value, but jurors might
place too much weight on such an offer. If evidence of the offer is
allowed into evidence, the party making the offer would suffer unfair
prejudice.
The drafters also found that the exclusions of Rule 408 promote the
public policy favoring the settlement of disputes.43 If courts generally
allowed offers to settle into evidence, parties would be less likely to
enter into settlement talks or make settlement offers. The drafters
wanted to avoid admitting evidence that might encourage parties to
proceed to trial without considering settlement.
While the drafters’ arguments may have justified the exclusion of
offers to settle and actual settlement agreements, their findings did not
necessarily justify the exclusion of conduct or statements made during
compromise negotiations.44 Indeed, the legislative history of the old
Rule 408 indicates that Congress had some reservations about the
proposed rule’s exclusion of conduct and statements made during
settlement talks. The House Committee on the Judiciary initially
amended the proposed rule to exclude actual admissions of fault without
excluding “unqualified factual assertions” made during settlement

41. See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note, 28 U.S.C. § app. 870 (2000) (amended
2006).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Consider Rule 409, which concerns offers to pay medical expenses. While evidence of the
actual offer to pay medical expenses is excluded, any factual statements or conduct incident to the offer
are not excluded. See FED. R. EVID. 409 advisory committee’s note. The Advisory Committee found
that communication is not essential to an offer to pay, so broad protection of statements made incident to
an offer to pay is unnecessary. Id. Thus, any admission of fault made just before or just after an offer to
pay medical expenses is admissible.
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talks.45 The House Committee noted that a party could ensure
statements made during settlement talks would remain inadmissible by
“couching them in hypothetical conditional form.”46 Thus, in the above
personal injury hypothetical, defendant’s statement, “I was intoxicated at
the time of the accident,” would be admissible because it is an
unqualified factual assertion and not an actual admission of fault;
however, the same statement made in hypothetical or conditional form
would be inadmissible under the House Committee’s amendment to
proposed Rule 408.
Ultimately, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary disagreed with the
House Committee, finding that the failure to exclude factual assertions
would chill settlement negotiations because the parties would be
discouraged from communicating freely.47 The Senate Committee
deleted the House Committee’s amendment, restoring the proposed rule
to its original form as submitted by the Supreme Court.48 The House
Committee adopted the amendment, 49 and the old Rule 408 was borne.
It is fair to say that the portion of the rule related to statements or
conduct made during settlement talks exists to protect the public policy
encouraging settlements; however, that portion of the rule is probably
not a concrete application of Rule 403. While evidence of an offer to
settle is not probative of the offeror’s culpability,50 an actual statement
of fault holds more probative value.51 Furthermore, the risk of unfair
prejudice is lower where a statement of fault is involved. The drafters of
408 wanted to ensure that jurors would not place too much significance
on an offer to settle. However, where a statement of fault is involved,
any resulting prejudice to the speaking party may not be unfair at all.52
Rule 408 remained unchanged for roughly thirty-one years.
45. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 8 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7081.
46. Id. at 7082.
47. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 10 (1974), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7056–57.
48. Id. at 7057. The Senate Committee also added an amendment that was ultimately adopted by
the House and added to the final version of the old Rule 408. The amendment, added as the third
sentence of the rule, stated: “This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations.” FED. R. EVID.
408, 28 U.S.C. app. § 870 (2000) (amended 2006). The Senate Committee added the sentence to
discourage parties from turning over discoverable and likely incriminating documents during the course
of settlement negotiations to ensure their inadmissibility at trial. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 10 (1974), as
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7057.
49. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 6 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7099.
50. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
51. See White v. Honeywell, Inc., 141 F.3d 1270, 1276 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that party’s
admission in a racial discrimination lawsuit was highly probative on the issue of liability).
52. See United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 567 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Unfair prejudice ‘does not
mean the damage to a defendant’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the
evidence . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Schrock, 855 F.2d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 1988))).
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However, following enactment of the rule, some controversy arose
regarding the rule’s applicability to criminal proceedings. In United
States v. Prewitt, for example, the issue arose in a mail fraud case.53 In
Prewitt, the government accused defendant Smillie of defrauding
investors in an insurance business venture.54 Prior to Smillie’s
indictment for mail fraud, the Securities Division of the Indiana
Secretary of State’s office commenced an investigation of his business
practices and ultimately issued a cease and desist order commanding that
Smillie’s company stop doing business in the state of Indiana.55 Smillie
entered into settlement negotiations with the Securities Division, and
investigators interviewed him on two occasions.56 Two years later, the
government indicted Smillie for mail fraud.57 At trial, the government
sought to introduce statements that Smillie made to a Securities Division
investigator during his negotiations with the agency.58 In the statements,
Smillie admitted that he had utilized the investors’ money to pay for his
personal expenses.59
Smillie was convicted, and he based his appeal on the language of
Rule 408.60 Smillie claimed that the trial court should have excluded his
statements to the Securities Division investigator because they were
made during compromise negotiations.61 The Seventh Circuit disagreed,
finding that the old Rule 408 was not applicable to criminal
proceedings.62 The court held that the rule’s reference to validity and
amount of claim signaled it was only applicable to civil proceedings.63
Additionally, the court noted that public policy actually called for
admission of the statements in this case because “[t]he public interest in
the prosecution of crime is greater than the public interest in the
settlement of civil disputes.”64 Therefore, even though the original
proceedings between Smillie and the Securities Division were civil in
nature, the court found that Smillie’s statements were admissible in the
later criminal proceeding.65 Likewise, the Second and Sixth Circuits
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

34 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 438.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 439.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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have held that the old Rule 408 only applied to civil proceedings.66
In United States v. Bailey, the Tenth Circuit came to a different
conclusion.67 In Bailey, defendant was convicted of wire fraud and
money laundering.68 Like Smillie, Bailey was accused of using
investors’ funds for his own personal benefit. Virtually all investors in
Bailey’s partnership lost their investments, and two investors filed civil
lawsuits against Bailey.69 The suits were eventually certified as class
actions and consolidated. Ultimately, the civil suit was settled.70
However, at Bailey’s criminal trial, the government offered the
testimony of Wilgers, Bailey’s former partner and a plaintiff in the civil
suit.71 Wilgers testified that, during settlement talks, Bailey admitted he
had withdrawn and used $1.3 million from the partnership accounts
without the permission of his fellow partners.72
Bailey was convicted, and on appeal, he argued that Wilgers’
testimony should have been excluded based on the old Rule 408.73 The
Tenth Circuit commenced its analysis by citing Federal Rule of
Evidence 1101(b), which provides that the Federal Rules of Evidence
generally apply to criminal cases and proceedings.74 Next, the court
looked to Rule 408 itself and found that nothing in the language of the
rule prohibited its use in criminal proceedings.75 Additionally, the court
cited the final sentence of the old Rule 408, which provided that the rule
“does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another
purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or prosecution.”76 According to the Tenth Circuit, the final
phrase regarding criminal investigations or prosecutions would be
rendered superfluous if the court were to find the rule only applicable to

66. See United States v. Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 367 (6th Cir. 2001); Manko v. United States, 87
F.3d 50, 54–55 (2d Cir. 1996).
67. 327 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2003).
68. Id. at 1137.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1144.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1145.
75. Id. at 1146.
76. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 408, 28 U.S.C. app. § 870 (2000) (amended 2006)). The Advisory
Committee’s Notes following the old Rule 408 indicate that this sentence was added so that evidence of
“[a]n effort to ‘buy off’ the prosecution or a prosecuting witness in a criminal case” would not be
excluded under the rule. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note, 28 U.S.C. app. § 870 (2000)
(amended 2006).
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civil proceedings.77 Finally, the Tenth Circuit found that public policy
called for exclusion of settlement evidence in later criminal proceedings,
noting that “the potential prejudicial effect of the admission of evidence
of a settlement can be more devastating to a criminal defendant than to a
civil litigant.”78 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits agreed that the old Rule
408 was applicable in both civil and criminal cases.79
To settle the split between the circuits, the Advisory Committee
amended Rule 408. It states:
(a) Prohibited uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible on
behalf of any party, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or
amount of a claim that was disputed as to validity or amount, or to
impeach through a prior inconsistent statement or contradiction:
(1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish—or accepting or
offering or promising to accept—a valuable consideration in
compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and
(2) conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding
the claim, except when offered in a criminal case and the negotiations
related to a claim by a public office or agency in the exercise of
regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.
(b) Permitted uses. This rule does not require exclusion if the evidence
is offered for purposes not prohibited by subdivision (a). Examples of
permissible purposes include proving a witness’s bias or prejudice;
negating a contention of undue delay; and proving an effort to obstruct a
criminal investigation or prosecution.80

The new Rule 408, enacted on December 1, 2006, is similar to the old
Rule 408 in that it excludes from admissibility settlement offers and
acceptances where such evidence is offered to prove liability.81
However, unlike the old Rule 408, the new rule does not exclude all
conduct and statements made during compromise negotiations. Rather,
the rule generally excludes such evidence but allows for the
admissibility of conduct or statements “offered in a criminal case
[where] the negotiations related to a claim by a public office or agency
in the exercise of regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.”82
77. Bailey, 327 F.3d at 1146.
78. Id. Accord United States v. Hays, 872 F.2d 582, 589 (5th Cir. 1989) (“It does not tax the
imagination to envision the juror who retires to deliberate with the notion that if the defendants had done
nothing wrong, they would not have paid the money back.”).
79. See United States v. Arias, 431 F.3d 1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2005); Hays, 872 F.2d at 588–89.
80. FED. R. EVID. 408.
81. Compare FED. R. EVID. 408, with FED. R. EVID. 408, 28 U.S.C. app. § 870 (2000) (amended
2006).
82. FED. R. EVID. 408.
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In essence, the new Rule 408 settles the circuit split by stating that the
ban on statements and conduct made during settlement talks applies
equally to civil and criminal proceedings, except where the government
plays the role of civil litigant. Where a civil defendant makes
incriminating statements to government officials working in a
regulatory, investigative or enforcement capacity, those statements are
admissible in a later criminal proceeding.
The Notes following the new Rule 408 provide a great deal of
information regarding the Advisory Committee’s decision to amend.
The Notes indicate that the new rule provides no protection for
statements made to government officials because “[w]here an individual
makes a statement in the presence of government agents, its subsequent
admission in a criminal case should not be unexpected.”83
The new Rule 408 distinguishes statements made to government
officials from statements made to private parties. According to the
Advisory Committee Notes, when private parties enter into settlement
talks, it is impossible for either party to ensure that statements made
during those talks will not be disclosed.84 As a result, the new Rule 408
protects such statements from disclosure in both civil and criminal cases
because the failure to do so would greatly chill settlement negotiations
and be contrary to the policy of Rule 408.85 However, the Notes state
that where a defendant seeks to protect statements made during
compromise negotiations with the government, the defendant should
seek to enter into an agreement with the government agency that would
prohibit subsequent disclosure.86
While the amendment to Rule 408 may seem minor on its face, its
impact is great. The next section of this Article explores the various
scenarios in which the government acts as civil litigant, both
investigating private individuals and negotiating civil settlements with
those persons, all the while failing to alert them of their potential
criminal liability.
II. THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS
Various federal and state agencies are charged with enforcing statutes
that carry both civil and criminal penalties. Where a single act of
misconduct creates the possibility of both criminal and civil liability, the
actor may face parallel criminal and civil proceedings that occur
83.
84.
85.
86.

FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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simultaneously or successively.87 This Article focuses on the civil and
criminal enforcement power of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)88 and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).89 While
each of these entities possesses enforcement authority through statute,
the agencies’ powers are not identical.
A.

The Enforcement Authority of the SEC

The SEC is responsible for enforcement of the federal securities
laws.90 The SEC has four divisions including the Enforcement Division,
which investigates alleged violations of the securities laws.91 There are
several alleged violations of the securities laws which may lead to an
investigation by the Enforcement Division. Those alleged violations
include insider trading, misrepresentation or omission, manipulation of
market prices of securities, stealing customers’ funds or securities,
unfair treatment of customers by broker-dealers, and the sale of
securities without registration.92
Congress has provided the SEC with several tools to carry out its
charge including investigative and subpoena powers as well as the
87. SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1980). There is no requirement
that the civil proceeding is stayed pending resolution of the criminal proceeding. See infra Part IV.B.
See also Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 52 (1912) (“An imperative rule that
the civil suit must await the trial of the criminal action might result in injustice or take from the statute a
great deal of its power.”). However, some federal agencies suspend their civil investigations as a matter
of policy. Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1379.
88. President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the SEC following the stock market crash of 1929 to
restore confidence in the markets. How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#create (last visited Sept. 3,
2007). The SEC consists of five Commissioners appointed by the President, four divisions, and eighteen
offices. Id. There are approximately 3,800 SEC staff members. Id.
89. The IRS, a bureau of the Department of the Treasury, dates back to 1862, when President
Abraham Lincoln and Congress created an income tax structure to finance the Civil War. Brief History
of IRS, http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=149200,00.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). Today, the IRS
is made up of one commissioner, two deputy commissioners, four operating divisions, and five other
principal offices. Id.
90. Specifically, the SEC is responsible for enforcement of the following statutes: Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77mm (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm
(2000); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–77bbbb (2000); Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64 (2000); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–80b-21
(2000); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
91. See How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital
Formation, supra note 88. The other divisions of the SEC are the Division of Corporation Finance,
which regulates corporate disclosure to the public, the Division of Market Regulation, which establishes
and maintains standards for the markets, and the Division of Investment Management, which regulates
investment companies like mutual funds. Id.
92. Id.
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power to bring a civil lawsuit against any individual or corporation it
believes has violated the federal securities laws.93 The SEC’s subpoena
power is significant, allowing the Commission to compel the attendance
of witnesses and the production of documents.94 The failure of any
person to comply with an SEC subpoena constitutes a misdemeanor and
subjects the individual to up to one year in prison and a fine of up to
$1,000.95
The SEC’s power to bring a civil lawsuit is also notable. The
Commission may seek injunctive relief, monetary penalties, or both in
federal district court against any person who has committed or is about
to commit a violation of the federal securities laws.96 The Commission
also has the power to prohibit persons from serving as officers and
directors of corporations due to violations of the securities laws.97
Finally, the Commission has the power to enter into settlements with
“[a]ny person who is notified that a proceeding may or will be instituted
against him or her, or any party to a proceeding already
instituted . . . .”98 Thus, even where the SEC is in its investigative stages
and has not filed a civil complaint, it has the authority to settle with any
person who is the subject of an SEC investigation.
Despite its broad authority in the realm of civil enforcement, the SEC
has no power to bring criminal charges based on violation of the federal
securities laws. Rather, the Commission has the authority to transmit
any relevant evidence to the U.S. Attorney General, who may, in his or
her discretion, pursue criminal penalties.99 To that end, the Director of
the SEC’s Division of Enforcement and the SEC’s General Counsel
possess the authority to recommend certain cases to the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ or Justice) for criminal prosecution.100 Even where the
SEC chooses not to make a formal recommendation to the DOJ, it may
notify Justice of cases with potential criminal liability by granting the

93. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (Supp. IV 2004). The SEC also has the power to bring enforcement
actions before an Administrative Law Judge. See How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, supra note 88.
94. Id. § 78u(b).
95. Id. § 78u(c).
96. Id. § 78u(d).
97. Id. § 78u(d)(2).
98. 17 C.F.R. § 201.240(a) (2007).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.24c-1(b)(1) (2007) (authorizing the
Commission to disclose nonpublic information to federal, state, local or foreign governments as it deems
necessary).
100. 17 C.F.R. § 200.19b (2007). The SEC has the option of formally recommending certain
cases to the DOJ for criminal prosecution or simply opening up SEC investigative files for review by the
DOJ, which is a much more informal process. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (2007).
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DOJ access to SEC files.101 Thus, even though the SEC lacks the power
to bring criminal charges, it plays a very significant role in the DOJ’s
decision to do so through its production of evidence to the DOJ as well
as its recommendation that certain cases are ripe for criminal
prosecution.
Following a recommendation of criminal prosecution, the SEC may
continue its civil investigation and issue any necessary subpoenas.102
The Commission is not required to stay its civil proceedings pending
resolution of any criminal case that involves the same individual.103
Indeed, it may be inappropriate for the Commission to suspend a civil
investigation due to the pendency of criminal charges.
The
Commission’s investigations often involve the dissemination of false
and misleading information to the public that should be enjoined
immediately,104 and the failure to seek a civil injunction promptly could
result in irreparable harm to a company’s investors.105
B.

The Enforcement Authority of the IRS

Similar to the SEC, the IRS possesses the power to enforce the federal
tax laws. Title 26, Section 7601 of the U.S. Code charges the Secretary
of the Treasury with the duty of canvassing the country in search of
persons who may be liable for violations of the federal tax laws.106 In
order to assist the IRS in carrying out this mission, Congress provided
the agency with a broad subpoena power, authorizing the IRS to
examine relevant documents, summon persons relevant to its
investigation, and administer oaths to and take testimony of relevant
witnesses.107 Like the SEC, the IRS may enforce its summonses through
the federal district courts.108 A person’s failure to respond to an IRS
summons constitutes a misdemeanor, exposing the individual to up to
one year in prison and a fine of no more than $1,000.109

101. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (stating that the SEC “may also, on some occasions . . . grant
requests for access to its files made by . . . domestic and foreign governmental authorities”). See also 5
ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD &
COMMODITIES FRAUD § 12:98 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 2006) (noting that SEC and DOJ collaboration has
increased since the SEC began opening its files to the DOJ).
102. SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
103. Id. at 1377.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 26 U.S.C. § 7601(a) (2000).
107. Id. § 7602(a).
108. Id. § 7604(b).
109. Id. § 7210.
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Sections 7206 and 7207 of the Internal Revenue Code create criminal
liability for any person who willfully makes false statements on a tax
return or willfully furnishes the IRS with fraudulent tax returns.110 Like
the SEC, the IRS has no power to bring criminal charges against a
taxpayer accused of violating these laws.111 Yet unlike the SEC, the
IRS, in each of its district offices, has a criminal investigation (CI)
division.112 The CI division of the IRS utilizes its summons power to
investigate conduct that may eventually result in criminal charges.113
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the IRS must also have a
concurrent civil purpose for the issuances of any summons, such as the
potential assessment of civil penalties.114 Thus, “[T]he IRS at that stage
is empowered to issue investigative summonses under Section 7602,
even though the fruits of such summonses may be useful for the
illegitimate purpose of ‘filing criminal charges against citizens’ as well
as the legitimate purposes of determining and collecting taxes.”115 If the
CI division determines that a taxpayer’s violations rise to the level of
criminal conduct, it may recommend criminal prosecution to the DOJ.116
Another route to a criminal prosecution recommendation is through a
collection investigation. While an investigation into the collection of
taxes is completely civil in nature, collection employees and the CI
division may agree to commence parallel investigations that might
ultimately result in a recommendation to Justice.117
110. Id. §§ 7206–7207 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
111. See United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 312 (1978).
112. See Criminal Investigation (CI) At-a-Glance, http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id
=98398,00.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). Special agents of the CI unit are authorized to execute
search and arrest warrants and carry firearms. IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL §§ 9.1.2.4, 9.1.2.4.1 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/ch01s02.html.
113. See Criminal Investigations (CI) At-a-Glance, supra note 112.
114. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 313–14. Following the LaSalle decision, Congress amended the tax
summons statute to provide that prior to a recommendation of criminal prosecution to the DOJ, the IRS
could use its summons power to inquire into “any offense connected with the administration or
enforcement of the internal revenue laws.” 26 U.S.C. § 7602(b). Several courts have held that the
amendment allows the issuance of an IRS summons for either a civil or criminal purpose prior to referral
of the case to the DOJ. See, e.g., La Mura v. United States, 765 F.2d 974, 980 n.9 (11th Cir. 1985);
Pickel v. United States, 746 F.2d 176, 183–85 (3d Cir. 1984). However, other courts have held that it is
still unlawful for the IRS to issue summonses for solely criminal purposes. See United States v.
Michaud, 907 F.2d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Hintze v. IRS, 879 F.2d 121, 127 n.8 (4th Cir.
1989), overruled on other grounds by Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 15–17
(1992); United States v. Lawn Builders of New Eng., Inc., 856 F.2d 388, 391–92 (1st Cir. 1988). The
circuit split will remain until the Supreme Court rules on the issue.
115. SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
116. See 26 U.S.C. § 7602(d).
117. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 112, §§ 5.1.5.1, 5.1.5.2, available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/ch01s06.html. The IRS may also decide to pursue the criminal and
collection investigations simultaneously, sharing information whenever possible. Id. § 5.1.5.8. Indeed,
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The dual uses of the IRS’s summons power result in an unavoidable
intermingling of civil and criminal investigations. As the U.S. Supreme
Court has noted, a single IRS investigation can result in criminal
misconduct and a civil tax penalty.118 The Court has also stated that
Congress realized and intended that the IRS summons power would be
used for both criminal and civil purposes when it drafted the tax laws.119
Indeed, the Service’s summons power is not conditioned upon the
criminal or civil nature of the investigation.120 As the High Court has
noted, “Congress has not categorized tax fraud investigations into civil
and criminal components.”121
Yet, a recommendation of criminal prosecution greatly affects the
investigative powers of the IRS. According to the Internal Revenue
Code, while the IRS may continue any civil investigation commenced
prior to a recommendation of criminal prosecution to the DOJ,122 the
Service may not issue summonses.123 Congress prohibits the issuance of
summonses in this situation for several reasons. First, any such
summons might infringe upon the role of the grand jury as the “principal
tool of criminal accusation.”124 Clearly, Congress preferred that the
grand jury use its subpoena power to gather information that might be
used to indict an individual. Second, Congress suspended the summons
power of the IRS following a recommendation for criminal prosecution
in order to ensure that the IRS’s civil summons power would not be used
to gather evidence for a criminal case.125 Although the grand jury
subpoena power is quite broad,126 the government’s discovery rights are
the Internal Revenue Manual requires quarterly coordination meetings between collection and criminal
investigators who are pursuing a common person or entity. Id. § 5.1.5.5.
118. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 309.
119. Id. at 310, 311 n.14 (“The interrelated nature of fraud investigations thus was apparent as
early as 1864. Section 14 of the 1864 Act permitted the issuance of a summons to investigate a
suspected fraudulent return. It also prescribed a 100% increase in valuation as a civil penalty of
falsehood.”).
120. 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a).
121. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 311.
122. Id. at 311–12 (“The Government does not sacrifice its interest in unpaid taxes just because a
criminal prosecution begins.”).
123. 26 U.S.C. § 7602(d)(1) (“No summons may be issued under this title, and the Secretary may
not begin any action under section 7604 to enforce any summons, with respect to any person if a Justice
Department referral is in effect with respect to such person.”). The Code states that a Justice
Department referral is in effect if “the Secretary has recommended to the Attorney General a grand jury
investigation of, or the criminal prosecution of, such person for any offense connected with the
administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws.” Id. § 7602(d)(2)(A)(i).
124. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 312.
125. Id.
126. See Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury: Converging Streams of
Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 47 VAND. L. REV. 573, 606 (1994) (“The IRS cannot procure
anything by way of a summons that a grand jury cannot obtain by use of its subpoena power. Civil
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greatly restricted once the grand jury returns an indictment. The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure’s discovery provisions are much more
limited than a civil litigant’s discovery rights under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.127 For example, under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the government is entitled to the production of
documents in a criminal case only if the defendant requests and receives
documents from the government.128 However, under Rule 16’s civil
counterpart, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, any party is allowed to
request documents from any other party, and the party receiving the
request must object to the request, produce the documents, or face
sanctions under Rule 37.129 Thus, Congress suspended the summons
power of the IRS in order to avoid the abusive use of the summons
power during the preparation of criminal cases.
Another effect of a recommendation for criminal prosecution involves
the Service’s power to settle cases. Prior to recommendation, the IRS
possesses the power to settle any criminal or civil case arising out of
violations of the tax laws.130 However, a recommendation to the DOJ
divests the Service of the power to negotiate settlement in either the civil
or the criminal case and gives that power to Justice.131 It should be
noted that settlement of a civil tax suit is not likely while a criminal case
is pending. According to U.S. Attorney’s Tax Resource Manual, the
DOJ has a policy of refusing to settle civil cases while criminal charges
are pending.132 The DOJ prefers to give priority to the criminal case and
summons power simply is not any broader than a grand jury’s criminal discovery through compulsory
process, which extends to anything of conceivable relevance to the investigation and prosecution of a
criminal case.”).
127. Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 1962) (“While the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have provided a well-stocked battery of discovery procedures, the rules governing criminal
discovery are far more restrictive.”). The Campbell court pointed out three justifications for the
restrictive nature of criminal discovery:
First, there has been a fear that broad disclosure of the essentials of the prosecution’s case
would result in perjury and manufactured evidence. Second, it is supposed that revealing
the identity of confidential government informants would create the opportunity for
intimidation of prospective witnesses and would discourage the giving of information to
the government. Finally, it is argued that since the self-incrimination privilege would
effectively block any attempts to discover from the defendant, he would retain the
opportunity to surprise the prosecution whereas the state would be unable to obtain
additional facts. This procedural advantage over the prosecution is thought to be
undesirable in light of the defendant’s existing advantages.
Id. at 487, n.12 (quoting Developments in the Law—Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1052 (1961)).
128. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
129. FED. R. CIV. P. 34, 37(a)(2)(B).
130. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7122(a) (2006).
131. Id.
132. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 6-6.200 (2007), available
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will not consider settlement of the civil case until the individual has been
sentenced in the criminal case.133
C. An Explanation of the Differences in Agency Power
The SEC possesses the power to vigorously pursue its civil
investigations following a recommendation to the DOJ while the IRS
loses its power following such a recommendation.134 The statutory
grants of authority and the risk of harm to the public are two factors that
may explain the difference in power. As stated earlier, Congress
provided the SEC with unwavering authority to investigate civil
violations of the securities laws, even following a recommendation to
the DOJ.135 Yet, with regard to the IRS, Congress stripped the IRS of
many of its investigative powers following a recommendation to
Justice.136 Several courts have focused on the language of the authoritygranting statutes to justify the dissimilarity in power following a
recommendation to the DOJ.137 According to the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, “Unlike the Internal Revenue Code . . . , the securities
laws offer no suggestion that the scope of the SEC’s investigative
authority shrinks when a grand jury begins to investigate the same
matters.”138
at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title6/6mtax.htm#6-6.200.
133. Id. While the DOJ’s policy may have its critics, it is consistent with DOJ policy in similar
circumstances. For example, the DOJ will usually refuse to enter plea agreements in criminal tax cases
where the defendant is willing to make financial restitution. See id. § 6-4.360, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title6/4mtax.htm#6-4.360 (“If it is concluded
that there is a reasonable probability of conviction and that prosecution would advance the
administration of the internal revenue laws, any decision to forgo prosecution on the ground that the
taxpayer is willing to pay a fixed sum to the United States, would be susceptible to the attack that a
taxpayer who is able to pay whatever amount of money the government demanded had been given
preferential treatment.”). Additionally, the DOJ has a long-standing policy against approving plea
agreements in criminal cases that include global settlements—that is, settlement of the civil tax liability
as well as the criminal tax liability. See Memorandum from Stanley F. Krysa, Dir., Criminal
Enforcement Sections, to All CES Attorneys (June 3, 1993), in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL TAX
MANUAL
(2001),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/readingroom/2001ctm/03ctax.htm
#CIVIL%20SETTLEMENTS.
134. Note, however, that courts are cognizant of the possibility that SEC subpoenas could be used
to subvert the restrictive Federal Criminal Procedure Rules that limit discovery following grand jury
indictment. See infra notes 141–142 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 122–123 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“But IRS
investigative and enforcement proceedings are not analogous to those of the SEC. The language of the
securities laws and the nature of the SEC’s civil enforcement responsibilities require that the SEC retain
full powers of investigation and civil enforcement action, even after Justice has begun a criminal
investigation into the same alleged violations.”).
138. Id. at 1380.
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Another reason for the disparity involves the public harm associated
with violations of the securities laws versus the lack of harm to the
public involved when the tax laws are violated. The SEC’s need to
move swiftly to enjoin fraud on the public is, in the eyes of the courts,
more important than the IRS’s need to collect outstanding taxes:
Unlike the IRS, which can postpone collection of taxes for the duration of
parallel criminal proceedings without seriously injuring the public, the
SEC must often act quickly, lest the false or incomplete statements of
corporations mislead investors and infect the markets. Thus the
Commission must be able to investigate possible securities infractions
and undertake civil enforcement actions even after Justice has begun a
criminal investigation. For the SEC to stay its hand might well defeat its
purpose.139

The differences in agency power following a recommendation of
criminal prosecution to the DOJ are significant for purposes of this
Article. At least in the case of the IRS, where the agency loses the
power to negotiate upon a recommendation to Justice, it seems that the
Service would be highly motivated to settle any pending civil tax case
prior to the recommendation. Otherwise, the power to settle the civil
matter is left to the DOJ, which may decide to handle the civil and
criminal matters simultaneously or solely pursue the criminal case.
Taxpayers who find themselves in settlement talks with the IRS
regarding civil tax liability must recognize that they can negotiate both
the civil and criminal aspects of their cases with the IRS.140 This may
prove difficult for many individuals, especially when the civil
negotiations take place prior to the convening of a grand jury or the
filing of any criminal charges against the individual. Where the
defendant, or the defendant’s counsel, does not realize the possibility of
criminal charges being filed, the defendant may make incriminating
statements during settlement of the civil case that could re-surface to
become the basis for later criminal charges.
Even if the SEC is the investigating agency, the Commission may be
motivated to settle cases prior to recommendation to Justice. Although
the SEC maintains its investigative power following such a
recommendation, the SEC’s subpoena power may be limited following
indictment of an individual by the grand jury. Following indictment,
courts must ensure that the SEC’s subpoena power is not used to expand
the prosecution’s discovery rights beyond those allowed under the strict

139. Id.
140. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.141 Therefore, where the SEC is a
“mere conduit for a future criminal prosecution,”142 the Commission’s
subpoena power is uncertain following a grand jury indictment. Due to
this limitation, the SEC may delay the recommendation of a case to
Justice until it has completed its civil investigation. It also may decide
to negotiate the civil case without mentioning the possibility of criminal
charges. The negotiation of a pending civil case without mention that
the agency plans to recommend criminal charges to Justice sets a trap for
any person who does not realize the impact of the new Rule 408.
Due to the strong likelihood that administrative agencies will gather
information that the DOJ could use in a subsequent criminal
prosecution, one might expect that certain safeguards are in place to
protect persons who are the subjects of existing or possible parallel
proceedings. As the next section demonstrates, current constitutional
and evidentiary safeguards do not provide a great deal of shelter to
individuals who face concurrent civil and criminal liability at the hands
of the government.
IV. PROTECTIONS AVAILABLE FOR THE SUBJECTS OF PARALLEL
PROCEEDINGS
This Part of the Article addresses the array of constitutional,
evidentiary, and contractual protections that likely come to mind when
counsel considers how to properly defend a person who is the subject of
parallel proceedings. This Part demonstrates that these protections are
not nearly as strong as one might expect.
A.

The Constitutionality of Parallel Proceedings
1.

Double Jeopardy

Initially, counsel may wonder if parallel proceedings
unconstitutionally subject individuals to multiple punishments for the
same act. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states:
“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb.”143 Although the language of clause appears
to be fairly straightforward, “this deceptively plain language has given
141. See Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1391 (Edwards, J., concurring). Accord SEC v. Zimmerman, 854 F.
Supp. 896 (N.D. Ga. 1993). See also supra notes 125–129 and accompanying text.
142. Zimmerman, 854 F. Supp. at 900.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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rise to problems both subtle and complex.”144 For example, the clause
appears to solely address situations where one’s “life or limb” is at
stake. Yet, the Supreme Court found in 1873 that the clause applies to
all criminal offenses, whether misdemeanors or felonies.145
Additionally, while the clause prohibits one from being tried twice for
the same offense, 146 it also prohibits one from being punished twice for
the same offense.147
The concept of punishment for the same offense provides the basis for
a potential objection to parallel proceedings. Counsel for an individual
facing parallel proceedings could argue that the client is facing two
punishments for the same offense. If the IRS settles a civil suit for the
repayment of back taxes plus a penalty,148 counsel has a colorable
argument that a subsequent criminal indictment and prosecution for the
same Tax Code violations might constitute Double Jeopardy. To be
sure, it is well established that “Congress may impose both a criminal
and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission” without
violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.149 However, where the civil
sanction rises to the level of punishment, a later criminal prosecution for
the same act might violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.150 For purposes
of this Article, the attachment of Double Jeopardy to a settlement with a
government agency would absolve any harm caused by the new Rule
408. If Double Jeopardy attaches to most, if not all, settlements between
civil defendants and government agencies, then there would be no
practical need to be concerned with the later use of a defendant’s
incriminating statements. A look at the jurisprudence on this issue will
quickly show that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to most
civil proceedings.
In Hudson v. United States, the High Court addressed the issue of
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented parallel proceedings

144. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 32 (1978).
145. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 172–73 (1873).
146. Crist, 437 U.S. at 35 (holding that jeopardy attaches when a trial jury is empaneled and
sworn). However, in bench trials, jeopardy attaches when the first witness is sworn. Id. at 37 n.15
(citing Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975)).
147. Lange, 85 U.S. at 173. Accord United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 273 (1996) (“The
Clause serves the function of preventing both ‘successive punishments and . . . successive
prosecutions.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993))).
148. Oftentimes, the IRS assesses a large tax penalty for those who violate the Tax Code. See 26
U.S.C. § 6651 (2000).
149. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
150. See generally Ursery, 518 U.S. at 267 (considering the question of whether an in rem civil
forfeiture action, following a criminal prosecution for the same act, constitutes a violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause).
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related to an alleged bank fraud.151 The defendants were officers of two
banks. In the late 1980s, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency
(OCC) commenced an investigation of the defendants to determine if
they had violated various banking laws.152 Ultimately, the OCC
determined that the defendants had violated certain banking statutes and
regulations. The agency assessed penalties against the defendants and
commenced proceedings to bar the defendants from “further
participation in the conduct of any insured depository institution.”153 In
October 1989, the defendants entered into a consent order with the OCC.
By signing the order, the defendants agreed to pay a total of $44,000 in
assessments. The defendants also agreed to debarment—that is, they
agreed not to participate in the affairs of any depository institution
without written approval from the OCC and all other relevant regulatory
agencies.154 Approximately three years after settlement of the OCC
matter, the defendants were indicted on charges of conspiracy,
misapplication of bank funds, and making false bank entries.155 The
federal charges were based on the same transactions that formed the
basis for the OCC investigation. The defendants moved to dismiss the
indictment, arguing that the subsequent criminal charges violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause.156
The Supreme Court commenced its Double Jeopardy analysis by
addressing whether the OCC assessment was criminal in nature.157 The
Court found that one might initially answer this question by looking to
the authority-granting statute. Where lawmakers expressly label a
penalty as civil, this designation should carry some weight in
determining whether the punishment is civil or criminal.158 However,
the analysis does not end with a review of a penalty’s statutory
construction. According to the Court, even a penalty labeled as civil
may implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause where “‘the statutory scheme
[is] so punitive either in purpose or effect’ as to ‘transfor[m] what was
clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’”159 The
151. 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
152. Id. at 96.
153. Id. at 97 (internal quotation omitted).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 98.
157. Id. at 99.
158. Id.
159. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1980); Rex
Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)). The Hudson Court identified seven factors that
should be used to evaluate whether a civil statute has been transformed into a criminal statute. They are:
(1) “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it
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Court noted that “only the clearest proof” will override the intent of the
legislature and transform a civil penalty into a criminal penalty.160
Looking to the facts of the case, the Hudson Court found that
Congress designated the applicable monetary penalty statutes as civil in
nature.161 Additionally, even though Congress did not label the
debarment statute as civil, the Court found that the statute’s grant of
authority to the federal banking institutions, rather than courts of law, is
prima facie evidence that Congress intended the sanction of debarment
to be civil.162 Next, the Court found that the defendants had failed to
provide sufficient proof that the monetary and debarment penalties were
so punitive as to transform them into criminal penalties.163 According to
the Court, neither type of penalty has historically been viewed as
punitive.164 Indeed, the Court noted that “‘revocation of a privilege
voluntarily granted,’ such as a debarment, ‘is characteristically free of
the punitive criminal element.’”165 Thus, the Hudson Court found that
Double Jeopardy did not apply despite the fact that defendants were
subjected to civil and criminal penalties for the same conduct.166
In the context of parallel proceedings involving the SEC, the outcome
is similar. In United States v. Van Waeyenberghe, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed whether a prior SEC lawsuit and settlement
would bar a later criminal indictment.167 In Van Waeyenberghe, the
defendant was indicted for conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, and
money laundering, all in relation to an investment company he
created.168 The defendant was found guilty on all counts. On appeal,
defendant argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause should have
prevented the filing of the criminal charges considering a settlement

has historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3) “whether it comes into play only on
a finding of scienter”; (4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment—retribution and deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it”; and (7) “whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned.”
Id. at 99–100 (alteration in original) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69
(1963)).
160. Id. at 100 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).
161. Id. at 103.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 104.
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting and citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 399 n.2 (1938)).
166. Id. at 105.
167. 481 F.3d 951 (7th Cir. 2007).
168. Id. at 953.
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agreement he had entered into with the SEC.169 The SEC and the DOJ
conducted parallel investigations of the defendant, and the defendant
entered into a consent decree with the SEC about eighteen months
before he was indicted on the criminal charges.170 The consent decree
required defendant to disgorge profits of $24.5 million and pay $6.8
million in prejudgment interest in addition to a $110,000 civil penalty.171
The court applied the two-part Hudson test, first finding that SEC
penalties are prima facie civil in nature.172 Next, the court found that the
defendant failed to provide “the clearest proof” that the SEC’s civil
remedy has been transformed into a criminal penalty.173 The court
found that disgorgement, injunction, and restitution are equitable in
nature and create no obstacle to a later criminal prosecution.174 As for
the civil penalty of $110,000, the court found that the amount was not so
excessive as to transform the civil penalty into a criminal penalty.175
Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause generally does not provide protection
against parallel proceedings involving the SEC.
Likewise, parallel proceedings involving the IRS typically will not
create a Double Jeopardy violation. In Morse v. Commissioner, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the issue of Double
Jeopardy in the context of tax penalties.176 In Morse, the defendant was
indicted for filing a false tax return for the years 1991 through 1994.177
The charges resulted in a conviction, and defendant was ordered to pay
$61,000 in restitution.178 The defendant fully paid the restitution by
September of 1999.179 In August of 2000, defendant learned that the
IRS was pursuing tax deficiencies and civil penalties against him for the
tax years 1991 through 1994.180 The tax court ordered the defendant to
pay tax deficiencies of $51,000 and civil fraud penalties of $38,000,

169. Id. at 953, 956.
170. Id. at 956.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 958 (citing United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 711 (7th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Perry, 152 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 1998) (“SEC disgorgement remedies are not criminal
punishments.”); United States v. Gartner, 93 F.3d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1996); SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d
689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
173. Id. at 959.
174. Id. at 958–59.
175. Id. at 959.
176. 419 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2005).
177. Id. at 831.
178. Id. The defendant was also sentenced to eighteen months in prison and ordered to pay a
$10,000 fine and $3,379.62 for prosecution costs. Id. at 831–32.
179. Id. at 832.
180. Id.
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calculated as seventy-five percent of tax deficiencies.181 On appeal, the
defendant claimed that the tax court order constituted a violation of his
Double Jeopardy rights because he had previously been convicted of
filing false tax returns for the same tax years.182
The court applied the Hudson factors in determining that the tax court
order did not violate defendant’s Double Jeopardy rights.183 The court
found that tax penalties are civil on their face because they are imposed
by an administrative agency rather than a court of law.184 Next, the
court found that civil tax fraud penalties are remedial rather than
punitive in nature, because they are “enacted ‘primarily as a safeguard
for the protection of the revenue and to reimburse the Government for
the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the
taxpayer’s fraud.’”185 Thus, even though the civil fraud penalty required
that defendant pay his tax deficiency plus an additional amount equaling
seventy-five percent of the tax deficiency, the court did not find the
penalty to be a criminal punishment such that Double Jeopardy would
attach.186
It should be noted that it is not impossible for a civil penalty to be so
punitive that it is transformed into a criminal punishment. In
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, the Supreme Court found that a
civil tax was tantamount to a criminal penalty, thereby determining that
the state had violated defendant’s right against Double Jeopardy by
assessing the tax.187 Defendants in the case were arrested and convicted
of possession of marijuana with intent to sell after a raid of their farm.188
Following the defendants’ convictions, the Montana Department of
Revenue assessed $900,000 in taxes against the defendants under
Montana’s Dangerous Drug Tax Act.189 The Act imposed a tax on the
possession and storage of dangerous drugs.190 The Department of
Revenue determined the tax amount by assessing the market value of the
confiscated drugs.191 The Act instructed the state treasurer to allocate
the tax proceeds to youth evaluation and chemical abuse programs.192
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 834–35.
Id. at 835.
Id. (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938)).
Id. at 835.
511 U.S. 767, 783 (1994).
Id. at 771–72.
Id. at 773.
Id. at 770.
Id.
Id.
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The defendants in Kurth Ranch argued that the tax assessment violated
their Double Jeopardy rights, and the Supreme Court agreed.193 It found
that the Montana tax was very different from other taxes.194 First, it was
conditioned upon where the taxpayer had committed a crime.195 The
Court found that this condition indicated that the tax had a punitive
rather than a remedial or revenue-gathering purpose.196 Additionally,
the Act required that the tax be assessed “only after the taxpayer has
been arrested for the precise conduct that gives rise to the tax obligation
in the first place.”197 Thus, the entire class of taxpayers subject to the
Act was people who had been arrested for marijuana possession.198
Finally, the Court took issue with the tax because it was assessed on
goods the taxpayer no longer owned or possessed.199 Indeed, the goods
were oftentimes destroyed before the tax was assessed.200 For these
reasons, the Court found the Montana tax to be “a concoction of
anomalies, too far-removed in crucial respects from a standard tax
assessment to escape characterization as punishment for the purpose of
double jeopardy analysis.”201
In summary, the Double Jeopardy argument is usually unavailable to
a defendant who finds himself the subject of parallel proceedings. The
tax in Kurth Ranch was an outlier in that its punitive nature was clear.
However, when one considers statutes involving the IRS, SEC, and
other federal agencies, it becomes obvious that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not protect defendants facing parallel proceedings. The
next section of this Article discusses whether the privilege against selfincrimination serves as a protection for persons involved in civil
governmental actions that have the potential to become criminal actions.
2.

Miranda and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination

At the outset, it is important to discuss whether forcing an individual
to endure parallel proceedings creates a violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination.
Defendants facing parallel proceedings have
unsuccessfully argued that having to deal with both proceedings
193. Id. at 773, 776.
194. Id. at 781.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 781–82.
199. Id. at 783.
200. Id.
201. Id. Note that the Kurth Ranch Court did not engage in the two-part Hudson test. Kurth
Ranch pre-dated Hudson by three years but remains good law.
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simultaneously creates constitutional problems.202
Specifically,
defendants have argued that contending with parallel proceedings forces
an individual into an unfair situation. The individual must choose
between preserving his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination by not testifying in the civil lawsuit or testifying in the
civil suit, thereby making potentially incriminating statements that could
later become the basis for criminal charges.203 Courts typically reject
this argument, finding that such a defendant is not forced to invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination, for “although he may have been
denied his most effective defense by remaining silent, there is no
indication that invocation of the fifth amendment [will] necessarily
result[] in an adverse judgment.”204 To make matters worse, it is well
settled that once a civil defendant invokes his privilege against selfincrimination, the jury may draw an adverse inference of liability on the
defendant’s part.205 Despite the negative inference associated with use
of the self-incrimination privilege in a civil setting, no constitutional
barrier prevents the commencement of parallel proceedings.206
Although a civil defendant facing parallel proceedings is entitled to
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, the defendant may not be aware
of this right. In the context of civil investigations that culminate in
criminal indictments, several courts have discussed whether an
individual facing investigation by a government agency is entitled to a
warning regarding the use of self-incriminating statements. In Miranda
v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that persons subject to custodial
interrogations by law enforcement officers are entitled to certain

202. See, e.g., Diebold v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 611 F.2d 697, 701 (8th Cir. 1979).
203. See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1286 (5th Cir. 1979). See also SARA SUN BEALE
ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW & PRACTICE § 10:4 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that a defendant facing parallel
proceedings “may invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to both proceedings. If he does
that, however, he may impair his ability to defend the civil case. On the other hand, he may testify in his
own behalf in the civil action in order to defend that action adequately. If he does that, however, he may
incriminate himself in the criminal case.”).
204. White, 589 F.2d at 1286.
205. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (“Our conclusion is consistent with the
prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil
actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the
Amendment ‘does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause.’”
(quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2272, at 439 (John T.
McNaughton rev. 1961)).
206. See SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also United
States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970) (“It would stultify enforcement of federal law to require a
governmental agency such as the FDA invariably to choose either to forego recommendation of a
criminal prosecution once it seeks civil relief, or to defer civil proceedings pending the ultimate outcome
of a criminal trial.”).
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warnings.207 Such an individual is entitled to be warned “that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed.”208 One could argue that a
Miranda warning would cure the problem created by the new Rule 408.
If defendants are warned that their statements could be used against
them in a later criminal trial, then there may be no problem with the new
Rule 408. In actuality, Miranda warnings do not adequately protect
individuals facing parallel investigations.
Most importantly, the case law demonstrates that Miranda warnings
are usually not required for civil investigations conducted by
governmental agencies. In Beckwith v. United States, the Supreme
Court held that a defendant who was interviewed by IRS agents was not
entitled to a reading of his Miranda warnings even though his statements
to the agents became the basis for a criminal prosecution for income tax
evasion.209 The Court found that the defendant had failed to prove he
was in the midst of an in-custody interrogation, which is one of the
requirements of Miranda.210 Rather, the IRS agents questioned the
defendant in his home and the record showed that the conversation
between the agents and the defendant was “friendly” and “relaxed.”211
Additionally, the record showed that the agents did not force the
defendant to answer questions he could not or chose not to answer.212
Because the questioning of the defendant was not “initiated by law
enforcement officers after [the defendant had] been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,”
the requirements of Miranda did not apply.213 The Court based its
reasoning on the lack of a custodial interrogation even while
acknowledging that tax investigations rarely result in pretrial custody of
the defendant.214 The holding in Beckwith hurts defendants engaged in
settlement talks with governmental agencies because those talks would
likely be non-custodial. Thus, the investigators are not required to warn
defendants that statements made during settlement talks could later be
used against them.
207. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
208. Id. at 444.
209. 425 U.S. 341, 347–48 (1976).
210. Id. at 346.
211. Id. at 343.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 347 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
214. Id. at 345. It is the lack of an in-custody interrogation, not the lack of a criminal charge or
indictment, that causes the inapplicability of Miranda. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968)
(holding that Miranda warnings do apply to in-custody interviews conducted by the IRS).
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While Miranda warnings are not constitutionally required when
agency investigators conduct interviews, the SEC and the IRS do
provide Miranda-type warnings to their interviewees. The SEC’s Form
1662 is entitled “Supplemental Information for Persons Requested to
Supply Information Voluntarily or Directed to Supply Information
Pursuant to a Commission Subpoena.”215 The SEC provides the form to
all testifying witnesses.216 It states that interviewees and witnesses may
assert their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
that any information provided may be used against them.217 The IRS
offers similar warnings to its interviewees. The IRS provides its agents
with two scripts, a Non-Custody and an In-Custody Statement of
Rights.218 The In-Custody Statement of Rights mirrors the warnings set
out in Miranda.219 The Non-Custody Statement of Rights is very similar
to the SEC warning in that it informs interviewees of their privilege
against self-incrimination and informs them that their statements may be
used against them.220
Because the IRS and SEC warnings are not constitutionally required,
several courts have found that the agencies’ failure to inform individuals
of their rights will have no bearing on the admissibility of any selfincriminating statements. In United States v. Caceres, the Supreme
Court found that the IRS’s failure to follow its internal procedures
regarding authorization for electronic surveillance did not call for
suppression of defendant’s recorded statements.221 The Court based its
holding on the fact that the agency regulations were not constitutionally
or statutorily required.222 The Court also stated that agencies are entitled
to exercise discretion in applying their own procedural rules.223 Finally,
the Court noted that excluding evidence for an agency’s failure to follow
its own guidelines might “have a serious deterrent impact” on the
215. SEC FORM 1662, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/sec1662.pdf.
216. See United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086 (D. Or. 2006), vacated in part and
rev’d in part, 521 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2008).
217. FORM 1662, supra note 215, at 2 (“Information you give may be used against you in any
federal, state, local or foreign administrative, civil or criminal proceeding brought by the Commission or
any other agency. You may refuse, in accordance with the rights guaranteed to you by the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to give any information that may tend to
incriminate you or subject you to fine, penalty or forfeiture.”).
218. See IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, IN-CUSTODY STATEMENT OF RIGHTS (2001), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/36208003.html; IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NON-CUSTODY
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS, available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/36208004.html.
219. See IN-CUSTODY STATEMENT OF RIGHTS, supra note 218.
220. See NON-CUSTODY STATEMENT OF RIGHTS, supra note 218.
221. 440 U.S. 741, 744 (1979).
222. Id. at 749–50.
223. Id. at 754.

TO SPEAK - FORMATTED

2008]

10/17/2008 11:19:07 AM

TO SPEAK OR NOT TO SPEAK?

969

creation of new regulations.224 In the Court’s opinion, “it is far better to
have rules like those contained in the IRS Manual, and to tolerate
occasional erroneous administration of the kind displayed by this record,
than either to have no rules except those mandated by statute, or to have
them framed in a mere precatory form.”225 Based on the holding in
Caceres, at least one court has held that an IRS agent’s failure to read
the agency’s Miranda-like warnings to a non-custodial interviewee did
not call for suppression of the interviewee’s statements.226
B.

Motion for Stay

A defendant facing parallel proceedings may be unable to suppress
incriminating statements on constitutional grounds, but the defendant
may be successful in seeking a stay of the civil proceedings pending
resolution of the criminal case. Although a stay of civil proceedings is
not constitutionally required where criminal charges are pending or
likely,227 courts have the discretion to stay civil cases where justice so
requires.228 However, a stay is an extraordinary remedy.229
Several courts have articulated factors that should be applied to
determine whether a stay of a civil proceeding is appropriate pending
resolution of a companion criminal case. These factors include the
extent to which the facts of the civil and criminal cases overlap,230
224. Id. at 755–56.
225. Id. at 756.
226. United States v. Bencs, 28 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The suppression of evidence does
not depend on whether agents violate internal operating procedures, but on whether those procedures are
required by either the Constitution or federal law.” (citing Caceres, 440 U.S. at 749–55)). But see
United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 777 (9th Cir. 1980) (“In unusual circumstances, a failure of the
IRS substantially to comply with the requirements of this published procedure might provide grounds
for the suppression of the fruits of the improperly conducted interview.” (citing Caceres, 440 U.S at
755–57)).
227. Ashworth v. Albers Med., Inc., 229 F.R.D. 527, 530 (S.D. W. Va. 2005) (“Because of the
frequency with which civil and regulatory laws overlap criminal laws, American jurisprudence
contemplates the possibility of simultaneous parallel proceedings and the Constitution does not mandate
the stay of civil proceedings in the face of parallel criminal proceedings.” (citing SEC v. Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1374–75 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322,
324 (9th Cir. 1995))).
228. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n.27 (1970) (collecting cases). See also Landis v. N.
Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936) (“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of
judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” (citing Kan. City S.
Ry. v. United States, 282 U.S. 760, 763 (1931); Enelow v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 382
(1935))).
229. Weil v. Markowitz, 829 F.2d 166, 174 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
230. Walsh Sec., Inc. v. Cristo Prop. Mgmt., Ltd., 7 F. Supp. 2d 523, 526–27 (D.N.J. 1998) (citing
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whether the defendant has been indicted in the criminal case,231 the
extent to which the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination is
implicated,232 whether a delay would cause significant prejudice to
plaintiffs, and the burden imposed on defendants.233 In SEC v. Sandifur,
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington applied
these factors to determine whether a civil lawsuit brought by the SEC
should be stayed due to a criminal investigation involving the
defendant.234 In Sandifur, the defendant moved to stay SEC proceedings
against him after a co-defendant in the civil case was indicted.235
Although the defendant had not yet been indicted, he argued that
criminal charges were imminent and that a stay was required on this
basis.236 Applying the above-referenced factors, the court found that the
two investigations “overlap[ped] 100%.”237 Additionally, it was
undisputed that the SEC and DOJ had worked together to investigate the
defendant.238 Despite these findings, the court ruled that a stay was
unnecessary, especially considering that the defendant had not yet been
indicted.239 Moreover, the court found that even if defendant had
already been indicted, the SEC’s and the public’s interest in resolving
the civil case outweighed any burden to the defendant.240 The Sandifur
court’s ruling makes clear that those persons affected by the new Rule
408 are very unlikely to win a motion to stay the administrative
proceeding. The individuals most negatively affected by the new Rule
408 are unindicted. They are merely facing the possibility of criminal
prosecution. Without an indictment, such a defendant will have a
difficult time obtaining a stay.

Trs. of Plumbers and Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1139
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
231. Id.
232. Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1995).
233. Id.
234. No. C05-1631C, 2006 WL 1719920 (W.D. Wash. June 19, 2006).
235. Id. at *1.
236. Id.
237. Id. at *2.
238. Id.
239. Id. Accord Walsh Sec., Inc. v. Cristo Prop. Mgmt., Ltd., 7 F. Supp. 2d 523, 527 (D.N.J.
1998) (“[B]ecause there is less risk of self-incrimination, and more uncertainty about the effect of a
delay on the civil case, pre indictment requests for a stay are generally denied.” (citing United States v.
Private Sanitation Indus. Ass’n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 802, 805 (E.D.N.Y. 1992))).
240. Sandifur, 2006 WL 1719920, at *2. See also id. at *3 (finding that “the public’s interest in
deterring future wrongdoing and in having confidence in the integrity of the securities markets is best
served by prompt resolution of this case”).
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C. The Effect of Government Deception
1.

The Government’s Duty to Warn

Counsel for a defendant facing a regulatory investigation may wonder
if the government agency is under an affirmative duty to alert the
defendant that a criminal investigation is underway. The case law is
clear in stating that the agency had no obligation to inform a defendant
that a criminal investigation is pending or that an indictment is likely.
For example, in United States v. Irvine, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether an agency carries an obligation
to warn a civil defendant that criminal charges are looming.241 In that
case, the defendant was charged with criminal tax violations. The
charges were based in large part on statements the defendant made to an
IRS agent who failed to inform the defendant that he was conducting a
criminal investigation.242 Because the agent’s omission violated IRS
procedure, the defendant in Irvine moved for suppression of several selfincriminating statements he made to the agent.243 Despite the agent’s
breach of IRS policy, the First Circuit found “[n]o case holds that an IRS
agent breaches a constitutional duty when he obtains information merely
by failing to state specifically that he is conducting a criminal
investigation.”244 Rather, an investigator runs afoul of the law only if he
makes “fairly serious affirmative misrepresentations” of fact.245 Another
case in accord with this approach is United States v. Parrott.246 In
Parrott, Judge Weinfeld of the Southern District of New York found
that the filing of the civil suit by the SEC “was ample notice that
[defendants’] conduct, the continuance of which was sought to be
enjoined, may well have run afoul of the criminal laws as well.”247
Judge Weinfeld found that once the agency informs civil defendants of
their self-incrimination privilege, it has no affirmative duty to inform
them that criminal charges may follow.248
Courts provide much greater protection to defendants where the
governmental agency has made affirmative misrepresentations in order
241. 699 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1983).
242. Id. at 44.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 46.
245. Id. (citing United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Lehman,
468 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970)).
246. 315 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
247. Id. at 1015.
248. Id.
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to obtain evidence. For example, where a defendant specifically asks a
government agent about the possibility of criminal charges prior to
commencement of the interview, courts have held that the agent’s failure
to disclose the involvement of the DOJ should result in suppression of
any statements or other evidence obtained.249
Likewise, the case law provides some protection for defendants facing
civil regulatory investigations that improperly merge with criminal
investigations. In United States v. Scrushy, the defendant was charged
with perjury.250 At trial, an SEC examiner testified regarding his
deposition of the defendant during a parallel civil investigation.251 The
government argued that defendant committed perjury during the SEC
deposition.252 The defendant moved to suppress his deposition based on
a claim of government deception.253 Specifically, the defendant claimed
that the SEC’s civil investigation was a disguise for the DOJ’s criminal
investigation of the defendant.254 To support his claim, defendant
established that the SEC examiner had taken instructions from the DOJ
regarding his examination of defendant.255 The U.S. Attorney’s office
instructed the SEC examiner to avoid certain questions so that the
defendant would not be alerted of the criminal investigation against
him.256 Additionally, the SEC moved defendant’s deposition to
Birmingham, Alabama at the request of the DOJ, ensuring that the U.S.
Attorney’s office would have favorable venue for resolution of the
perjury charges.257
Based on these facts, the court in Scrushy found that the SEC’s
investigation and the subsequent criminal charges “depart[ed] from the
proper administration of justice.”258 According to the court, the two
249. United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977) (“From the facts we find that the
agent’s failure to apprise the appellant of the obvious criminal nature of this investigation was a sneaky
deliberate deception by the agent under the above standard and a flagrant disregard for appellant’s
rights. The silent misrepresentation was both intentionally misleading and material.”). IRS policy is in
accord with this jurisprudence. The Internal Revenue Manual instructs agents conducting civil tax
investigations that “[u]nder no circumstances should the revenue officer inform the taxpayer that the
case has been referred to Criminal Investigation (CI). This is CI’s responsibility.” INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL, supra note 112, § 5.1.5.6, available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/ch01s06.html. Yet, the
Internal Revenue Manual also instructs its agents to provide accurate information and avoid misleading
the taxpayer. Id.
250. 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1135 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1137–38.
255. Id. at 1138.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1140.
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investigations ceased to be parallel when the DOJ recruited the SEC
examiner to become involved in the criminal investigation.259 The court
also noted the significant prejudice facing a civil defendant who is
unaware that criminal charges are imminent: “[T]he danger of prejudice
flowing from testimony out of a defendant’s mouth at a civil proceeding
is even more acute when he is unaware of the pending criminal
charge.”260 The court found that the only solution to the government’s
“cloak and dagger activities” was suppression of defendant’s deposition
testimony.261
Another recent case involving a similar issue of government
deception is United States v. Stringer.262 In Stringer, defendants moved
to dismiss the indictment against them because the SEC failed to alert
them of a pending criminal investigation. The district court found that
the FBI intentionally suspended its active investigation of the defendants
to allow the SEC an opportunity to obtain incriminating statements from
the defendants.263 Despite the government’s argument that SEC Form
1662 constituted adequate notice that criminal charges were possible
against the defendants,264 the court held that the commingling of the two
investigations was an abuse of process and violated the defendant’s due
process rights.265 The court dismissed the indictment against the
defendants, finding that the government’s conduct was “so grossly
shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of
justice.”266
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that Form 1662
provided the defendants with sufficient notice of the possibility of
criminal charges.267 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s
finding that the SEC had attempted to obtain incriminating evidence

259. Id. at 1139.
260. Id. at 1139 (quoting United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196, 200 (D.D.C. 1965)).
261. Id. at 1139–40.
262. 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (D. Or. 2006), vacated in part and rev’d in part, 521 F.3d 1189 (9th
Cir. 2008).
263. Id. at 1084–85.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 215–217.
265. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 1088–89 (“It would be a ‘flagrant disregard of individuals’
rights’ to ‘deliberately deceive, or even lull’ someone into incriminating themselves in the civil context
when ‘activities of an obvious criminal nature are under investigation.’” (quoting United States v.
Grunewald, 987 F.2d 531, 534 (8th Cir. 1993))).
266. Id. at 1089 (quoting United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983)). The court found that merely suppressing the evidence
obtained by the deception was not a sufficient remedy for defendants. Id. Rather, the only appropriate
remedy was dismissal. Id.
267. United States v. Stringer, 521 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2008).
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against the defendants in bad faith.268 Additionally, although the SEC
took steps to prevent the defendants from learning of the criminal
investigation against them by instructing its personnel not to mention
it,269 the Ninth Circuit found that the agency made no affirmative
misrepresentation that the SEC investigation was exclusively civil in
nature.270
While courts seem to provide some protection to defendants facing
parallel proceedings, they first require proof of strong government
deception and manipulation. In Scrushy for example, not only did the
SEC fail to inform the defendants of the pending criminal investigations
against them, but the agency also allowed the DOJ to have a hand in the
execution of the SEC investigation.271 This level of DOJ interference is
uncommon. For example, in United States v. Mahaffy, a defendant
moved for the suppression of statements he made to the SEC during a
civil investigation.272 The court analyzed the facts of Scrushy and
Stringer but ultimately concluded that the government had not engaged
in egregious conduct.273 The facts of Mahaffy established that the SEC
made its own decision to pursue a civil investigation of the defendant.274
Additionally, the SEC was unaware of the DOJ investigation against the
defendant for the first six months of the SEC investigation.275 The
Mahaffy court found that because the defendant and his attorney were
aware of the DOJ investigation prior to appearing for questioning
regarding the civil case, they were put on notice that their statements
could be used against them.276
The courts clearly will protect defendants who face prejudice as a
result of government deception, but a defendant seeking protection from
the courts carries a heavy burden. Unless a defendant facing parallel
investigations can show outrageous or egregious conduct on the part of
the government, the court is unlikely to suppress incriminating
statements the defendant makes during settlement talks with a
government agency. The agency is under no obligation to inform a
defendant of the pendency or possibility of a criminal investigation. The
268. Id. at 1197.
269. The court noted that an SEC staff attorney instructed court reporters not to mention the DOJ
during defendants’ depositions. Id. at 1198.
270. Id. at 1199.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 255–257.
272. 446 F. Supp. 2d 115, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
273. Id. at 126.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. (“There are no facts to suggest that the USAO hid behind or manipulated the S.E.C. with
the intention of misrepresenting its true intentions to the defendants.”).
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courts will step in to protect such defendants only where the government
makes an affirmative misrepresentation or uses the civil investigation as
a subterfuge for the criminal investigation.
2.

Contractual Agreements with the Government

The Advisory Committee Notes seek to the justify the amendment to
Rule 408 by advising defendants that they can ensure any statements
made will not become the basis for criminal proceedings by contracting
with the government agency to ensure non-disclosure.277 This subpart
analyzes the likelihood that a defendant might successfully contract with
the government to prevent the later use of incriminating statements made
during settlement negotiations.
Regulatory agencies and the DOJ routinely share information about
the subjects of parallel investigations. In recent years, the DOJ has
sought greater cooperation with regulatory agencies. The US Attorney
Manual encourages its employees to “consult with the government
attorneys on the civil side and appropriate agency officials regarding the
investigative strategies to be used in their cases.”278 Indeed, the Manual
encourages regular communication between Assistant U.S. Attorneys
and regulatory attorneys, especially “when the civil case is developing
ahead of the criminal prosecution.”279 Additionally, SEC policy allows
for the disclosure of files to the DOJ and other law enforcement
authorities even where the SEC has not yet made a formal
recommendation of criminal prosecution.280 Likewise, IRS policy
strongly encourages cooperation between agency representatives and
DOJ lawyers. The Internal Revenue Manual advises its agents that
“[s]haring information between revenue officers and government
attorneys assigned to the case is a key ingredient in developing civil and

277. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (“The individual can seek to protect against
subsequent disclosure through negotiation and agreement with the civil regulator or an attorney for the
government.”).
278. Memorandum from the Atty Gen. to All United States Attorneys, All Assistant United States
Attorneys, All Litigation Divisions, All Trial Attorneys (July 28, 1997), in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 132, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foia_reading_room/usam/title1/doj00027.htm#27.
279. Id.
280. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (2007). According to SEC regulations, “The Commission may
also, on some occasions, refer the matter to, or grant requests for access to its files made by, domestic
and foreign governmental authorities or foreign securities authorities, self-regulatory organizations such
as stock exchanges or the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and other persons or entities.”
Id. See also 5 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 101, at § 12:98 (“SEC and DOJ collaboration has
grown substantially since the 1970s when SEC shifted from formal criminal reference of cases to less
formal granting of DOJ requests for access to SEC investigative files.”).
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criminal cases simultaneously and efficiently.”281 The Manual states
that the sharing of information between civil and criminal authorities is
always appropriate unless disclosure on the part of the DOJ would
violate grand jury secrecy laws.282 These various authorities make clear
that governmental agencies and the DOJ all but require the sharing of
information. A defendant facing possible criminal charges would
probably have a difficult time negotiating a non-disclosure agreement
where agency and DOJ policy so strongly encourages disclosure and
cooperation. The Advisory Committee was sorely mistaken in its belief
that non-disclosure agreements were available to most defendants.283
While a defendant would likely be unsuccessful in negotiating an
agreement for non-disclosure, the defendant would have an even more
difficult time obtaining a promise not to prosecute. In Dresser
Industries, Inc. v. United States, the plaintiff corporation sued the SEC,
claiming that the Commission violated an agreement not to prosecute the
plaintiff for alleged criminal violations.284 The Fifth Circuit held that
any such contract would be unenforceable because the SEC lacks any
authority to bind the DOJ.285 The court noted that any person entering
into a contract with the government takes a risk that the government
actor may lack authority to bind the government or may be acting
beyond the scope of his authority.286 The court found, “If the rule were
281. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 112, § 5.1.5.8, available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/ch01s06.html#d0e5755.
282. Id.
283. The Advisory Committee made another mistake regarding the issue of non-disclosure. The
Committee reasoned that incriminating statements made during civil litigation between private parties
should remain excluded under the rule despite the availability of a non-disclosure agreement. FED. R.
EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note. The Committee found:
When private parties enter into compromise negotiations they cannot protect against the
subsequent use of statements in criminal cases by way of private ordering. The inability
to guarantee protection against subsequent use could lead to parties refusing to admit
fault, even if by doing so they could favorably settle the private matter. Such a chill on
settlement negotiations would be contrary to the policy of Rule 408.
Id. The Committee incorrectly assumed that a non-disclosure agreement with a regulatory agency could
bind the DOJ and prevent use of the statements, which is untrue. See infra text accompanying notes
285–287. Indeed, a regulatory agency has just as much power to bind the DOJ as a private litigant
has—none. At best, private plaintiffs and civil regulators can promise that they will not disclose the
statements. Such a promise is not enough to protect the policy behind 408. The Advisory Committee
realized that non-disclosure agreements were not the answer in one context but mistakenly relied upon
them in the other.
284. 596 F.2d 1231, 1236 (5th Cir. 1979)..
285. Id. See also id. at 1237 (“No statute authorizes agents of the SEC to grant immunity from
prosecution or to curtail the prosecutorial discretion of the Department of Justice and United States
Attorneys.”).
286. Id. at 1236 (citing Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947); Posey v. United
States, 449 F.2d 228, 234 (5th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. United States, 573 F.2d 1189, 1197–98 (Ct. Cl.
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otherwise, a minor government functionary hidden in the recesses of an
obscure department would have the power to prevent the prosecution of
a most heinous criminal simply by promising immunity in return for the
performance of some act which might benefit his department.”287
One type of promise that courts will enforce is an agency promise not
to recommend prosecution. The First Circuit dealt with this issue in
United States v. Rodman.288 In Rodman, a defendant claimed he made
incriminating statements to the SEC in exchange for a promise that that
the SEC would strongly recommend non-prosecution to the DOJ.289 The
SEC never fulfilled its promise. Indeed, the SEC attorney assigned to
the case was actually preparing a criminal reference at the time he made
the promise.290 The court held that the SEC’s failure to comply with its
agreement called for dismissal of the indictment.291
It is important to note that the defendant in Rodman had significant
bargaining power. His statements were not only self-incriminating, but
they also led to the filing of civil and criminal charges against other
individuals he incriminated.292 Counsel would be wise to create such a
quasi-immunity deal during settlement negotiations with the SEC.
However, where the defendant cannot implicate others, counsel may
have a difficult time obtaining a promise not to recommend criminal
prosecution.
Although the case law allows civil defendants to make some contracts
with the government regarding the non-disclosure of information or a
promise of non-referral, government agencies make such promises on a
case-by-case basis. Certain defendants, especially those with savvy and
experienced counsel, have a better chance of negotiating a civil
settlement that might protect against the later use of incriminating
statements. However, pro se defendants, defendants who lack the
resources to obtain an experienced attorney, and defendants who cannot
implicate others in exchange for quasi-immunity may have a tough time
obtaining such promises from government agencies.

1978)).
287. Id. at 1236–37.
288. 519 F.2d 1058 (1st Cir. 1975).
289. Id. at 1059.
290. Id.
291. Id. Even where an agency is willing to promise non-referral, courts have held that the
promise must be explicit. See United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (“[I]f
[attorneys] wish to condition their client’s participation or cooperation in a civil proceeding, conducted
by the SEC, upon an agreement by the SEC not to make a criminal reference, it is the obligation of
counsel to make that specific request, and then be guided by the SEC’s response to it.” (quoting United
States v. Fields, No. 76 Cr. 1022, 1977 WL 1022 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1977))).
292. Rodman, 519 F.2d at 1059.
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D. The Effect of Rule 403
The final protection that may be available to defendants facing
parallel proceedings comes in the form of another evidentiary rule,
Federal Rule of Evidence 403. As stated earlier, Rule 403 excludes
relevant evidence where the probative value of that evidence is
outweighed by “the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”293
In
anticipation of criticism about the new change to Rule 408, the Advisory
Committee stated that Rule 403 would protect persons subject to the
new rule. According to the Advisory Committee,
Statements made in compromise negotiations of a claim by a government
agency may be excluded in criminal cases where the circumstances so
warrant under Rule 403. For example, if an individual was unrepresented
at the time the statement was made in a civil enforcement proceeding, its
probative value in a subsequent criminal case may be minimal.294

This section of the article demonstrates that, in actuality, Rule 403
provides no protection for a pro se defendant facing parallel
proceedings.
1.

Applicability Based on the Plain Language of Rule 403

The main problem with the Advisory Committee’s argument is that
Rule 403, by its text, would not logically exclude incriminating
statements simply because the speaker is unrepresented by counsel.
Rule 403 excludes relevant evidence where its probative value is
outweighed by the risk that (1) the defendant will suffer unfair prejudice,
(2) the evidence will confuse or mislead the jury, or (3) the presentation
of the evidence will waste the court’s time.295 None of these risks
surface only where a pro se defendant makes incriminating statements.
As previously stated, the exclusion of offers to settle in Rule 408
reflects the drafters’ belief that this evidence would always be excluded
by Rule 403.296 The unfair prejudice of such evidence would always
outweigh its probative value because individuals may have many
reasons to settle other than their belief in their own culpability.297
However, the same logic does not apply to incriminating statements
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

FED. R. EVID. 403.
FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 41–42.
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made during settlement talks. Such statements are highly probative on
the question of an individual’s culpability.298 Rule 403 would only
exclude incriminating statements where their highly probative value is
outweighed by the factors listed in the rule.
Most often, defendants argue that Rule 403 should exclude relevant
evidence because the unfair prejudice that would result from admission
of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value. As stated
earlier, the Advisory Committee defines unfair prejudice as “an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though
not necessarily, an emotional one.”299 The Supreme Court defines unfair
prejudice in relation to a criminal defendant as “the capacity of some
concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt
on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.”300 In
essence, unfair prejudice exists where it is likely that the jury will place
too much significance upon a piece of evidence.
With regard to a defendant’s incriminating statements, the defendant
would likely have a difficult time establishing that the unfair prejudice
associated with the statements substantially outweighs their probative
value, even if he can show that he spoke with government officials
without an attorney. The absence of an attorney does not make
incriminating statements any less probative, and the lack of an attorney
hardly creates unfair prejudice as defined by the Advisory Committee
and the Supreme Court. Where a defendant’s statements establish his
involvement in or knowledge of a crime, any prejudice associated with
those statements is hardly unfair.301 As the Fifth Circuit has held, “Of
course, ‘unfair prejudice’ as used in Rule 403 is not to be equated with
testimony simply adverse to the opposing party. Virtually all evidence
is prejudicial or it isn’t material.”302 For the evidence to be excludable
under Rule 403, the prejudice must be unfair.303 Courts have found that
a certain level of prejudice will always result when a defendant
298. See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (“But unlike a direct statement of fault, an
offer or acceptance of a compromise is not very probative of the defendant’s guilt.”).
299. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note.
300. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997).
301. See United States v. Munoz, 36 F.3d 1229, 1233 (1st Cir. 1994). Munoz involved the
admissibility of the defendant’s spontaneous confession. In response to defendant’s argument that the
confession was highly prejudicial, the court stated: “The damage done to the defense is not a basis for
exclusion; the question under Rule 403 is ‘one of “unfair” prejudice—not of prejudice alone.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d 725, 740 (1st Cir. 1987)).
302. Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977). Accord United States v.
Haney, 914 F.2d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[The evidence] was prejudicial to the defendants in the
sense that it bolstered the prosecution’s case, but under that definition, all incriminating evidence is
prejudicial.”).
303. Dollar, 561 F.2d at 618.
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voluntarily makes incriminating statements.304 Additionally, the highly
probative value of the statements often vitiates any excessive
prejudice.305 Thus, under the plain language of Rule 403, the absence of
an attorney does not qualify as “unfair prejudice” such that highly
probative incriminating statements should be excluded.
2.

Applicability of Rule 403 Based on Public Policy

It is possible that, in stating that Rule 403 should exclude a pro se
defendant’s incriminating statements made during settlement talks, the
Advisory Committee was hinting to trial judges that they should base
their admissibility decisions on notions of fairness. For example, a trial
judge could find that Rule 403 should exclude defendant’s incriminating
statements simply because admitting the statements where the defendant
was unrepresented by a lawyer is unfair. There are at least two problems
with this approach.
First, a court’s decision to apply Rule 403 to ensure fairness is at odds
with the purpose of the rule. According to Professor Imwinkelried, the
purpose of Rule 403 is as follows:
An item of evidence can be excluded under the rule when its admission
realistically would jeopardize logical jury decisionmaking. The item
could distort the fact-finding process by inducing the jury to err at one of
the steps in its inferential process. The judge must attempt to predict the
likely effect of the evidence on the jury’s reasoning process. Drawing on
his knowledge of juror psychology, the judge tries to forecast the
probable response of the typical juror to the item of evidence.306

With this purpose in mind, Imwinkelried argues that Rule 403 is
concerned with management of the fact-finding and trial process.307 In
contrast, nothing in the text of Rule 403 suggests that extrinsic social
policies like fairness should play a role in a judge’s decision to admit or
exclude evidence under Rule 403.308 Indeed, Imwinkelried argues that
the use of Rule 403 to enforce extrinsic social policies “can lead to the
exclusion of relevant, reliable evidence and can handicap the jury’s

304. See United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509, 514 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding that a certain level of
prejudice “necessarily inheres in any freely made, extra-judicial admission by a defendant”).
305. Id.
306. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal Rule of
Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. REV.
879, 894–95 (1988).
307. Id. at 897.
308. Id.
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reasoning process.”309 Traditionally, the evidentiary privileges, rather
than Rule 403, have been the vehicle by which courts exclude relevant,
reliable evidence for extrinsic policy reasons.310 Allowing trial judges to
use Rule 403 to enforce extrinsic policy expands the power of the
judiciary and distorts the fact-finding process.311
Another problem with the Advisory Committee’s reasoning centers
on the Sixth Amendment right to an attorney. It is possible that the
Advisory Committee thought Rule 403 should function as a corollary to
the Sixth Amendment. Under the Sixth Amendment to the constitution,
criminal defendants hold a right to be represented by counsel.312 If the
government fails to inform a criminal defendant of this right313 or
continues to question a defendant who has made a request for an
attorney,314 courts will suppress any incriminating statements.315 The
problem with application of the Sixth Amendment rule in the context of
parallel proceedings is that a civil defendant has no Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.316 Therefore, courts could not justify the exclusion of
309. Id. at 898.
310. Id. at 900.
311. Id. at 907 (“[W]hen a judge excludes relevant evidence to promote an extrinsic social policy
other than the policies inspiring an evidentiary privilege, the judge encroaches on the legislative function
of formulating extrinsic policy.”).
312. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id. According to the Supreme Court, the amendment “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious
truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when
brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by
experienced and learned counsel.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938).
313. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966) (“In order fully to apprise a person
interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that
he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him.”). Of course, as stated in an earlier section of this article, Miranda warnings are only
required for in-custody interrogations. See supra Part IV.A.2.
314. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981) (“We further hold that an accused,
such as [defendant], having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not
subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless
the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”).
315. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964) (reversing defendant’s conviction
where he confessed after his request for counsel was denied).
316. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (referring only to criminal prosecutions). See also Austin v.
United States, 509 U.S. 602, 607–08 (1993) (“The protections provided by the Sixth Amendment are
explicitly confined to ‘criminal prosecutions.’” (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248
(1980))). Accord United States v. 6 Fox St., 480 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment’s
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highly probative statements on the ground that the person against whom
they are offered did not arrive at the settlement table with an attorney.
Indeed, the case law is clear that, in most circumstances, pro se parties
should not be given special treatment simply because they have chosen
to proceed without counsel.317 Additionally, even if the Advisory
Committee were correct in believing that the Sixth Amendment should
exclude a civil defendant’s incriminating statements, Rule 403 is not the
proper tool for exclusion of the evidence.
V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Although some safeguards are in place to protect persons who find
themselves the subject of a parallel investigation, tougher protection is
necessary. Initially, this Part demonstrates that the creation of an
evidentiary privilege for settlement communications is probably
unreasonable and insufficient to protect the rights of defendants.
Additionally, it proposes a solution that keeps defendants abreast of their
rights while ensuring that relevant evidence remains admissible.
A.

The Viability of a Settlement Communications Privilege

The creation of an evidentiary privilege for settlement
communications could provide great protection for defendants facing

guaranty of effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings does not extend to civil
proceedings.” (citation omitted)); Johnson v. Johnson, 466 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006) (same);
United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 333 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); Stanciel v. Gramley, 267 F.3d 575,
581 (7th Cir. 2001) (same).
317. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (holding that although pro se litigants
who are incarcerated may be given leeway as to application of procedural rules, “we have never
suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes
by those who proceed without counsel”). Accord O’Brien v. United States, 137 F. App’x 295, 301 (11th
Cir. 2005); Iwachiw v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 396 F.3d 525, 529 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005); Smith
v. Cooper, 83 F. App’x 837, 839–40 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[P]ro se litigants are not excluded from the rules
of evidence and procedure at trial . . . .” (quoting Members v. Paige, 140 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1998)));
Cormier v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 94-1061, 1994 WL 390120, at *3 (1st Cir. July 19, 1994); Birl v.
Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The right of self-representation does not exempt a party
from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. One who proceeds pro se with
full knowledge and understanding of the risks involved acquires no greater rights than a litigant
represented by a lawyer . . . . Rather, such a litigant acquiesces in and subjects himself to the established
rules of practice and procedure.” (citations omitted) (citing to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834
n.46 (1975); United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 311 (10th Cir. 1977))); United States v. Pinkey, 548
F.2d 305, 311 (10th Cir. 1977) (“The hazards which beset a layman when he seeks to represent himself
are obvious. . . . [T]he trial court is under no obligation to become an ‘advocate’ for or to assist and
guide the pro se layman through the trial thicket.” (citing Garrison v. Lacey, 362 F.2d 798 (10th Cir.
1966); Murphy v. Citizens Bank of Clovis, 244 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1957); Carrigan v. Cal. State
Legislature, 263 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1959); Barnes v. United States, 241 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1956))).
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possible parallel investigations. Not only would the government be
unable to introduce evidence of defendant’s incriminating statements at
trial, but the statements would be wholly undiscoverable based on the
language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1).318 Unfortunately,
neither case law nor public policy supports the implementation of such a
privilege.
1.

Support for the Creation of a Settlement Communications Privilege

Parties who have advocated for an evidentiary privilege for settlement
communications sometimes base their claims on the language of Rule
408. These parties have argued that the old Rule 408 itself functions as
a privilege. In In re Subpoena Issued to Commodity Futures Trading
Commission,319 an energy company moved to strike a subpoena issued
by a government agency.320 The subpoena sought certain documents
related to settlements between the energy company and third parties.321
The energy company argued that Rule 408 functions as a privilege that
should bar production of the settlement documents.322 The court
disagreed, finding that Rule 408 governs the admissibility rather than the
discoverability of settlement materials.323 Indeed, the court found that
Rule 408 is a rule which actually allows for the admissibility of
settlement materials for certain purposes.324 This, according to the
court, makes it “unlikely that Congress anticipated that discovery into
such documents would be impermissible.”325 The court noted that
Congress, rather than the courts, is authorized to amend the scope of
protection provided by Rule 408.326 The district court’s rejection of the
argument that Rule 408 constitutes an evidentiary privilege is in accord
with several federal opinions addressing the issue.327
318. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . .”).
319. 370 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D.D.C. 2005).
320. Id. at 204.
321. Id. at 207.
322. Id. at 210.
323. Id. at 211.
324. Id. See also FED. R. EVID. 408 (“This rule does not require exclusion if the evidence is
offered for purposes not prohibited by subdivision (a). Examples of permissible purposes include
proving a witness’s bias or prejudice; negating a contention of undue delay; and proving an effort to
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.”).
325. In re Subpoena, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 211.
326. Id. (“It is not for this Court to rewrite Rule 408 to craft a broader remedy for the precise
problem that Congress was attempting to address.” (citing Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension &
Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 1998))).
327. See, e.g., United States v. Union Pac. R.R., No. CIV 06-1740, 2007 WL 1500551, at *6 (E.D.
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While Rule 408, by its terms, does not function as an evidentiary
privilege, Rule 501 allows federal courts to create new evidentiary
privileges “in the light of reason and experience.”328 Although Rule 501
allows for the creation of new privileges, the Supreme Court is very
reluctant to do so because privileges “contravene the fundamental
principle that ‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.’”329
Thus, the Court has stated that it will recognize a new privilege only
when it “promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need
for probative evidence.”330
In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Court utilized Rule 501 to recognize a
privilege for communications between a psychotherapist and her
patient.331 In recognizing the privilege, the Court found that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege was very similar to the attorney-client
and spousal privileges in that each of them is “rooted in the imperative
need for confidence and trust.”332
The Court found that a
psychotherapist-patient privilege was essential to ensure proper
treatment.333 According to the Court, the proper treatment of mental and
emotional problems not only helps the individual patient but also helps
society, thereby serving the public interest.334 Also significant to the
Court was the fact that all fifty states and the District of Columbia had
already enacted some form of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The

Cal. May 23, 2007) (stating that the court “is not in a position to rewrite Rule 408 to automatically
protect from discovery all documents generated during or upon conclusion of settlement discussions”);
Sippel Dev. Co. v. W. Sur. Co., No. 05-46, 2007 WL 1115207, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2007) (“In our
view, the courts which have addressed this question have correctly determined that Federal Rule of
Evidence 408 does not create a discovery privilege but, rather, addresses whether evidence relating to
settlement discussions is admissible at trial.” (citing Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 122
F.R.D. 447, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 142 F.R.D. 80, 83–85
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Dep’t of Justice, 576 F. Supp. 739, 749 n.23 (D.D.C. 1983);
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 612 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (D.D.C.
1985))); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., Nos. 93 Civ. 5298, 93 Civ. 8270, 1996
WL 71507, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1996) (“[Rule 408] is not designed to lock away settlement
documents, forever shielding them from view by those not party to the agreement. While it is true that
the rule seeks to encourage the settlement process, it accomplishes that purpose not by making the
settlement information unavailable, but by limiting abusive use of positions taken during the process. . . .
The policy behind Rule 408 thus does not require any special restriction on Rule 26 because the
discovery rules do not affect admissibility.”); NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. U.S. Dept of
Justice, 612 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (D.D.C. 1985) (same).
328. FED. R. EVID. 501.
329. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (alteration in original) (quoting Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).
330. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
331. 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).
332. Id. at 10 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51).
333. Id.
334. Id. at 11.
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Court found that the existence of a consensus among the various
jurisdictions provided even greater support for recognition of the
privilege.335 Finally, the Court noted the fact that the psychotherapistpatient privilege was one of nine specific privileges that the Advisory
Committee recommended for inclusion in the Federal Rules of
Evidence.336 Although Congress did not enact any specific privileges as
part of the Federal Rules of Evidence,337 the Court in Jaffee found that
the Advisory Committee’s inclusion of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege indicated its view that the privilege “serve[d] a ‘public good
transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational
means for ascertaining truth.’”338
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., the
Sixth Circuit determined that reason and experience called for the
creation of a settlement communications privilege.339 The court found
that a settlement communications privilege would serve a “strong public
interest in favor of secrecy of matters discussed by parties during
settlement negotiations.”340 The court stated that settlements “foster[] a
more efficient, more cost-effective, and significantly less burdened
judicial system.”341
Yet, for settlement negotiations to end in
agreement, the parties must feel free to “make statements that would
otherwise belie their litigation efforts.”342 The court also noted that
settlement negotiations are often unreliable because they are “typically
punctuated with numerous instances of puffing and posturing.”343 Based
on the public policy favoring settlements and the inherent unreliability
of settlement statements, the Goodyear court held that settlement
negotiations were privileged and undiscoverable.344
Although some courts agree that a settlement communications

335. Id. at 13.
336. Id. at 14. See Proposed FED. R. EVID., 56 F.R.D. 183, 234–58 (Proposed Official Draft 1972)
(adopting Rule 502 (required reports privilege), Rule 503 (attorney-client privilege), Rule 504
(psychotherapist-patient privilege), Rule 505 (spousal testimonial privilege), Rule 506 (clergycommunicant privilege), Rule 507 (political vote privilege), Rule 508 (trade secrets privilege), Rule 509
(secrets of state privilege), and Rule 510 (identity of informant privilege)).
337. Rather than enacting specific privileges, Congress enacted Rule 501, which was intended to
“provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis.” 120
CONG. REC. 40891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate), quoted in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 47 (1980).
338. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50).
339. 332 F.3d 976, 983 (6th Cir. 2003).
340. Id. at 980.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 981.
344. Id.
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privilege is proper,345 many courts have criticized the Goodyear opinion.
Several courts have noted that the Goodyear court failed to apply the
factors utilized by the Supreme Court in Jaffee.346 The factors used by
the Supreme Court in Jaffee include the following: (1) whether a
significant public and private interest supports recognition of the
privilege; (2) whether there is a consensus among the states as to the
existence of the privilege; (3) whether the privilege is on the list
proposed by the Advisory Committee during creation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.347 The Supreme Court has also applied a fourth
factor in other cases concerning the creation of new privileges: whether
Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns and failed to
create a privilege.348 Application of these four factors in the context of a
settlement communications privilege actually militates against creation
of the privilege.
Looking to the first factor, a public interest clearly supports some
protection for settlement negotiations. The Goodyear court was correct
in stating that parties will be much more reluctant to engage in a frank
and open settlement discussion if they know their statements will remain
forever hidden.349 However, Rule 408, at least in its pre-amendment
form, provided adequate protection for parties who engage in settlement
discussions.350
Next, there is clearly no consensus regarding the creation of a
settlement communications privilege. While a few courts have approved

345. See Therapeutic Research Faculty v. NBTY, Inc., No. Civ.S-05-2322, 2006 WL 3371856, at
*1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2006) (denying motion to compel certain documents based on a privilege relating
to settlement communications); Allen County, Ohio v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 197 F.R.D. 352, 354 (N.D.
Ohio 2000) (same); Cook v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548, 554 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (“[T]he
[negotiating] parties may assume disputed facts to be true for the unique purpose of settlement
negotiations. The discovery of these sorts of ‘facts’ would be highly misleading if allowed to be used
for purposes other than settlement.” (citing Wyatt v. Sec. Inn Food & Beverage, Inc., 819 F.2d 69, 71
(4th Cir.1987))), overruled on other grounds by Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
346. See, e.g., JZ Buckingham Invs. LLC v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 15, 24 (2007) (citing
Goodyear and stating that “[m]ost courts recognizing a settlement privilege have failed to carefully
evaluate [the Jaffee] factors” (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. MediaTek, Inc., No. C-05-3148,
2007 WL 963975, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007))); Matsushita v. MediaTek, No. C-05-3148, 2007 WL
963975, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007) (“[T]he court in Goodyear did not analyze each of the
important factors identified by the United States Supreme Court in order to determine whether a new
privilege should be implied under Rule 501.”).
347. Matsushita, 2007 WL 963975, at *4 (citing Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11, 12–13 (1996); United
States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367–68 (1980)).
348. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990).
349. See Goodyear, 332 F.3d at 980.
350. See, e.g., WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 36, § 408.02[3] (“Rule 408 reflects the judgment
that free and frank discussions in negotiations leading toward settlement should be fostered, in order to
protect the courts against excessive litigation.”).
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of such a privilege,351 several federal and state courts have held that
recognition of settlement communications privilege is unjustifiable.352
Indeed, at least one district court in the Sixth Circuit has expressed its
disapproval of the new privilege even though lower courts are now
bound to recognize and apply the privilege.353 Additionally, some courts
have taken a position in the middle. These courts have held that
although settlement communications are discoverable, the party seeking
the evidence must make a particularized showing that the settlement
communications will likely lead to admissible evidence.354 Thus, no
consensus exists among the various jurisdictions regarding the propriety
of a settlement communications privilege.
The third factor requires courts to examine whether the proposed
privilege was included in the nine privileges that the Advisory
Committee proposed during the drafting of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
A privilege for settlement communications was not
included,355 which again suggests that no agreement exists regarding the
necessity of the privilege.
The final factor involves an examination of whether Congress
351. See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
352. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1124 n.20 (7th Cir.
1979) (finding that discoverability of settlement negotiations is consistent with the letter and spirit of
Rule 408); JZ Buckingham Invs. LLC v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 15, 23 (2007); Performance
Aftermarket Parts Group, Ltd. v. TI Group Auto. Sys., Inc., No. H-05-4251, 2007 WL 1428628, at *3
(S.D. Tex. May 11, 2007); Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp., LLC v. Midwest Division, Inc., No. 052164, 2007 WL 1246216, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2007); Sippel Dev. Co. v. W. Sur. Co., No. 05-46,
2007 WL 1115207, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2007); Matsushita, 2007 WL 963975, at *6; In re
Subpoena Issued to Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 370 F. Supp. 2d 201, 212 (D.D.C. 2005);
Bank Brussels Lambert v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., Nos. 93 Civ. 5298, 93 Civ. 8270, 1996 WL
71507, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1996); NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
612 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (D.D.C. 1985). Accord Citizens Commc’ns Co. v. Attorney Gen., 931 A.2d
503, 506 (Me. 2007); Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 856 N.E.2d 213, 235 (Ohio
2006).
353. See Grupo Condumex, S.A. de C.V. v. SPX Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 623, 629 n.3 (N.D. Ohio
2004) (“Regardless of any latent misgivings I might have about the propriety of the rule announced by
the Sixth Circuit in Goodyear, I am bound to apply governing Sixth Circuit precedent.” (citing City of
Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1013, 1023 (N.D. Ohio 1996))).
354. See Bottaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that the party
seeking the evidence must base its request on something more than “the hope that [the settlement
communications] will somehow lead to admissible evidence”). See also Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity
Indus., Inc., 142 F.R.D. 80, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“Bottaro attempts not to formulate the basis of a
privilege under Rule 408 but, rather, to formulate a framework for establishing the relevance of
settlement-related materials under Rule 26(b)(1) . . . .”). But see Rates Tech., Inc. v. Cablevision Sys.
Corp., No. 05-CV-3583, 2006 WL 3050879, at *3 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2006) (finding Bottaro’s
requirement of a particularized showing at odds with Rule 26, which allows discovery of any
information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence).
355. See In re Subpoena, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 211 (noting that a settlement communications
privilege was not listed among the nine privilege proposed by the Advisory Committee (citing Proposed
FED. R. EVID., 56 F.R.D. 183, 234–58 (Proposed Official Draft 1972))).
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considered the relevant competing concerns and failed to create a
privilege. Again, this factor suggests that a settlement privilege is
unnecessary. In creating Rule 408, Congress recognized the importance
of settlements and chose to enact a rule that would limit the admissibility
of settlement communications. However, Congress stopped short of
creating a privilege that would make settlement communications
undiscoverable. The rule itself indicates that Congress had no problem
with the use of settlement communications at trial where they were used
to prove anything other than culpability or non-culpability.356 Based on
each of the factors used by the Supreme Court in analyzing the necessity
of new privileges, it is clear that a settlement communications privilege
cannot stand.
2.

A Settlement Privilege as Protection for Defendants Facing Parallel
Investigations

While it may seem that a settlement communications privilege would
provide significant protection to defendants in parallel proceedings, such
a privilege actually provides no greater protection than the old Rule 408
provided.
First, a settlement communications privilege that protects the
discoverability of settlement talks would be of little aid to a defendant
concerned about the possibility of parallel investigations. Oftentimes, a
settlement communications privilege would work to prevent the
disclosure of settlement materials to third parties. In Goodyear, for
example, the appellants joined the action in an effort to convince the
trial court to vacate a confidentiality order put in place to protect
confidential negotiations between Goodyear and the original
defendant.357 Thus, the appellants were seeking access to settlement
negotiations to which they were not a party. In such a circumstance, a
privilege prohibiting discovery of the settlement negotiations provides a
great deal of protection to the negotiating parties. Not only is evidence
of the settlement negotiations inadmissible at trial, but it would be nondiscoverable to third parties. However, in the context of parallel
investigations, the government can likely prove defendant’s criminal
culpability without the use of discovery. Where a defendant has made
incriminating statements to a government agency, the DOJ has the
356. See FED. R. EVID. 408(b) (allowing the use of settlement communications for other purposes,
including “proving a witness’s bias or prejudice; negating a contention of undue delay; and proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution”).
357. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 977 (6th Cir.
2003).
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ability to call as witnesses in the criminal case any of the agency
employees who were present when the defendant made the statements.
Any such testimony is not hearsay, but admissible in court as an
admission by a party-opponent.358 The old Rule 408 would have
prevented the government’s use of the evidence at trial, thereby
providing sufficient protection to defendants facing parallel proceedings.
A settlement communications privilege would provide no greater benefit
to such a defendant. Clearly, a settlement communications privilege is
not the coat of armor that one might expect it to be, especially in the
context of parallel investigations.
Additionally, a settlement communications privilege would provide
little protection to defendants in parallel proceedings because the
privilege is likely waivable.359 Government agencies like the SEC
frequently require the subjects of their investigations to waive their
attorney-client privilege before settlement negotiations can
commence.360 This so-called “compelled voluntary disclosure” would
likely result in waiver of the settlement communications privilege as
well. Government agencies could require a waiver before any
settlement negotiations begin, and defendants, hoping to appear
cooperative and failing to realize the significant likelihood of criminal
charges, would probably sign away their privilege just as many
defendants have signed away their attorney-client privilege.
Considering the strong possibility that most defendants in parallel
proceedings would waive their settlement communications privilege if
required to do so by the government, the old Rule 408 actually provided
greater protection to these defendants because the rule is not a privilege

358. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). See also United States v. Simmons, 374 F.3d 313, 321 (5th
Cir. 2004) (affirming trial court’s admission of defendant’s incriminating statements under Rule
801(d)(2)(A)); United States v. McElhiney, 85 Fed. App’x 112, 115 (10th Cir. 2003) (same). Indeed,
even where the defendant’s statements are not incriminating, they are admissible simply because the
statements were made by defendant and offered by the government. See United States v. Reed, 227 F.3d
763, 770 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Therefore, the mere fact that the admitted testimony consisted of statements
made by Reed, but offered by the government in its prosecution of him, makes Reed’s testimony
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).”).
359. See Scotts Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 WL 1723506, at *2–3 (S.D.
Ohio June 11, 2007) (recognizing that the settlement communications privilege is waivable); Grupo
Condumex, S.A. de C.V. v. SPX Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 623, 629 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (same).
360. See Harry J. Weiss et al., Privilege and Cooperation, 1609 PLI/CORP 179, 181 (2007)
(“Federal government investigators have long sought waiver of the attorney-client privilege despite the
long history of the privilege in our legal system. In particular, the Securities and Exchange Commission
has sought waiver over the past twenty-five years . . . .”); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34
HOFSTRA L. REV. 897, 898 (2006) (noting the “increased vigilance of certain government agencies to
obtain voluntary waivers of the attorney-client privilege and work product protection in exchange for
possible prosecutorial or regulatory leniency”).
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and thus unwaivable.
B.

The Solution—A Multi-Pronged Approach

The current state of the law demonstrates that a settlement
communications privilege is not widely accepted. Indeed, the privilege
would probably not go far in protecting defendants who face the
possibility of parallel proceedings. The old Rule 408 treated all
negotiating parties equitably, and, ideally, a reversal of the amendment
to Rule 408 is a favorable solution. Until that occurs, the amended Rule
408 is the framework in which defendants must function.
1.

A Warning Regarding the Use of Defendant’s Statements

As stated earlier, Miranda warnings are not constitutionally required
for most settlement negotiations between regulatory agencies and
defendants,361 but the SEC and the IRS provide Miranda-like warnings
to defendants as part of agency policy.362 However, the current
warnings are general in nature and do not specifically address the impact
of incriminating statements made during settlement talks.363
Additionally, there is no guarantee that agency officials will provide the
current warnings at the commencement of settlement negotiations as
opposed to any other time during the investigative process. It is only
fair that defendants facing parallel proceedings receive something more.
These defendants are especially vulnerable because they may be
blindsided by the effect of the new Rule 408. Defendants facing parallel
investigations would benefit from knowing that the government has the
right to use their settlement communications against them. Thus, Part I
of the proposed warning would inform defendants that any incriminating
statements that they make during settlement negotiations may become
the basis for a later criminal action.
In addition to a warning regarding the use of settlement
communications, defendants facing parallel proceedings deserve to
know that government agencies routinely share information with law
enforcement agencies.364 This prong of the warning provides defendants
with a certain level of transparency regarding the investigative process.
It also provides clear notice to defendants that disclosure to a
government agency equals disclosure to the DOJ and state and local law
361.
362.
363.
364.

See supra text accompanying notes 209–214.
See supra text accompanying notes 215–220.
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 278–282.
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enforcement agencies.
Finally, defendants facing parallel proceedings deserve to be notified
of any pending criminal investigations against them. As one court has
stated, “[T]he danger of prejudice flowing from testimony out of a
defendant’s mouth at a civil proceeding is even more acute when he is
unaware of the pending criminal charge.”365 Disclosure of the existence
of any pending criminal investigations is necessary because it alerts
defendants that they are exposed to criminal liability and that they
should proceed cautiously.
The proposed multi-pronged warning states as follows:
Settlement Negotiation Warning
On December 1, 2006, Federal Rule of Evidence 408 was amended.
Section (a)(2) of the new rule provides that the following is admissible
in court: “conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations . . .
when offered in a criminal case and the negotiations related to a claim
by a public office or agency in the exercise of regulatory, investigative,
or enforcement authority.” Under the amended Rule, any conduct or
statements made during settlement negotiations with the government are
admissible in any criminal case that is filed against you. This document
shall serve as a warning that any incriminating statements made by you
can be used against you. This document shall also serve as notice that:
(1) This agency:
____ has shared or made plans to share information regarding your
case with federal, state or local law enforcement agencies,
including the Department of Justice;
or
____ has not shared or made plans to share information regarding
your case with federal, state or local law enforcement agencies,
including the Department of Justice;
and,
(2) This agency
____ is aware of pending criminal investigation(s) against you.
____ is not aware of any pending criminal investigation(s) against
you.

365. United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1139 (N.D. Ala. 2005) (quoting United
States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196, 200 (D.D.C. 1965)).
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Enforcement of the Warning

As stated earlier, courts do not typically suppress evidence because it
was obtained in violation of agency policy.366 However, the proposed
warning is a bit different from the agency regulations addressed in
Caceres. In discussing the surveillance authorization regulation that the
IRS violated, the Caceres Court noted that it was not a situation where
“an individual has reasonably relied on agency regulations promulgated
for his guidance or benefit and has suffered substantially because of
their violation by the agency.”367 Arguably, an agency’s failure to
provide the proposed settlement warning is the type of regulation that
the Caceres Court would have enforced because it would function as an
agency regulation promulgated for the benefit of defendants facing
parallel proceedings rather than an internal regulation upon which the
defendant does not rely. The dissent in Caceres agreed with this
reasoning. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, argued that the
failure of an agency to follow its own regulations is a due process
violation, especially where individual interests are implicated.368 Justice
Marshall advocated that “where internal regulations do not merely
facilitate internal agency housekeeping, but rather afford significant
procedural protections,” the Court must insist on agency compliance.369
An agency’s failure to provide the proposed settlement warning may
indeed constitute a violation of due process. In Montilla v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, the Second Circuit found a due process
violation where an INS hearing officer failed to require an alien to state
on the record whether or not he desired an attorney.370 INS policy
required the hearing officer to get an affirmative or negative response
from the alien, although the statement was not constitutionally
required.371 The court found that due process called for a reversal of the
deportation order because the agency’s failure to follow its own
procedure affected the rights and interests of the defendant rather than
internal agency procedures.372 According to the court, “Careless
observance by an agency of its own administrative processes weakens its
effectiveness in the eyes of the public because it exposes the possibility
of favoritism and of inconsistent application of the law.”373
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

See supra notes 221–226 and accompanying text.
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 752–53 (1979).
Id. at 758 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 760 (citiation omitted).
926 F.2d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 169 (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969)).
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Even if the failure to provide the settlement warning does not rise to
the level of a due process violation, promulgation of the warning in the
federal statutes or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would likely
give the warning much more force. In contrast of their treatment of
agency regulations, several courts have suppressed evidence where
agencies have violated statutory requirements.374 The difference in
treatment is probably explained by the fact that Congress, rather than the
agencies themselves, promulgate statutory requirements.
Where
Congress sees fit to require agency action through legislation, courts
tend to place more significance upon agency violations of the laws.
Thus, not only is the proposed settlement warning suitable for placement
in agency regulations, but also in federal statute or the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
3.

Impact of the Warning

Undoubtedly, the proposed warning will chill settlement negotiations.
Following receipt of the warning, a defendant will likely avoid a great
deal of communication with the government, thereby reducing the
likelihood that the parties will reach a settlement prior to trial. Yet the
settlement warning is necessary because it ensures that defendants will
be notified of their exposure to criminal liability.
Another consequence of the warning is that it allows for the
admissibility of highly probative evidence. As stated earlier, the drafters
of the old Rule 408 recognized that evidence of settlement offers was of
very low probative value.375 However, where a defendant makes
incriminating statements during settlement talks, those statements are
highly probative on the issue of defendant’s culpability.376 If a
374. See, e.g., United States v. Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d 545, 550 (9th Cir. 1979) (suppressing
evidence where FBI violated statutory law in conducting border searches); United States v. Tabi, No. 05
CR. 471, 2007 WL 582731, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2007) (“Caceres is distinguishable from the
present case in that there, the violation was one of agency regulations (relating to electronic
surveillance) only, not of a statute, as here.”), adhered to on reconsideration by No. 05 CR. 471, 2007
WL 1791257 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2007). However, several courts have held that the suppression of
evidence should be reserved for constitutional rather than statutory violations committed by the
government. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The use of the
exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.”
(citing United States v. Harrington, 681 F.2d 612, 615 (9th Cir. 1982))); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d
414, 424 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that a statutory violation did not call for suppression of evidence where
no constitutional violation was found). Contrary to the holdings of these cases, the Supreme Court
found many years ago that the suppression of evidence was an available remedy for violations of the
constitution, federal statutes and federal rules of procedure. United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255
(1966).
375. See supra text accompanying notes 41–42.
376. See supra text accompanying notes 51, 298.
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defendant voluntarily makes incriminating statements following
notification of the settlement warning, the opponents of the amended
Rule 408 can find some solace in the fact that the defendant was aware
of the potential impact of his statements.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the proposed settlement warning will provide adequate notice
to defendants facing parallel proceedings, it will certainly chill
settlement negotiations, which is the outcome Rule 408 seeks to prevent.
Unfortunately, without a reversal of the new rule, negotiations between
government agencies and defendants will suffer. The only defendants
who will be willing to engage in open and frank discussions with the
government will be those defendants ignorant of the amendment who do
not realize their exposure to criminal liability. If nothing else, the
proposed warning places all parties on equal footing regarding the
impact of their negotiations. Although the proposed warning leaves
defendants without a safety net, it alerts them of the net’s absence before
they leap.

